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ABSTRACT 
Herbalife is an international direct selling company involved in the production, 
promotion and sales of a variety of nutritional products including those designed to 
assist with weight management and personal care. The company has frequently come 
under legal scrutiny, most recently in the United States of America where it was the 
subject of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigation. Herbalife shareholders 
alleged that Herbalife International of America, Inc., Herbalife International, Inc., and 
Herbalife, Ltd. (the Herbalife companies) were operating like an illegal pyramid 
scheme rather than like a legitimate multi-level marketing (MLM) company which it 
purported to be.  
Pyramid schemes can take different forms and sizes but all share certain common 
characteristics. The main feature of these schemes is that distributors are primarily 
compensated for the introduction of new recruits rather than for actual retail sales. The 
problem with this is that there are a finite number of human beings to recruit and such 
schemes cannot sustain themselves. It is for this reason that pyramid schemes are 
mathematically improbable hence unlawful.  
The FTC investigation concluded that Herbalife was not a pyramid scheme but 
required that the company make certain changes to its business model and prove, 
going forward, that its business model is sustainable. This dissertation examines 
whether Herbalife’s business model amounts to a prohibited scheme under the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. This issue will be analysed particularly through 
the lens of section 43 of the Act. To help better understand the legal stance on pyramid 
schemes, pyramid schemes will be viewed in comparison with legitimate MLM firms 
such as Avon Products Inc. and Tupperware Brands Corporation. In addition, the 
Herbalife business model will also be viewed in light of other sections of the CPA which 
proscribes certain conduct. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Herbalife is an international direct-selling company that sells a range of products 
including those dealing with weight management and nutrition. The company sells 
products to its members who buy the product for either personal use or for resale to 
other members whom they have recruited. Herbalife also sponsors many athletes, 
professional teams and leagues as well a few National Olympic Committees, the likes 
of which include Portuguese soccer player Cristiano Ronaldo and soccer team Los 
Angeles Galaxy.1  
Herbalife has frequently come under legal scrutiny. Many people believe that Herbalife 
is a scam because it operates in a pyramid-like manner. However, others are of the 
view that Herbalife is a legitimate network marketing company. The manner in which 
Herbalife operates is what led to the allegations in the United States of America that 
Herbalife is an illegal pyramid scheme. However, following an investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it was concluded that the company was not in fact 
an illegal pyramid scheme.2 The Commission did, however, require Herbalife to make 
changes to its business practices and called on Herbalife to prove, going forward, that 
its business model is sustainable.3 Despite questions about Herbalife and its business 
model, no South African authority such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
or the National Consumer Commission (NCC)4 has investigated these allegations. 
                                                          
1 Kaki ‘Does celebrity endorsements have the potential to transform a brand?’ 1 August 2016                         
available at https://mpk732t22016clusterb.wordpress.com/2016/08/01/does-celebrity-endorsements-
have-the-potential-to-transform-a-brand/ (accessed on 17 May 2018). Information about Herbalife 
celebrity endorsements can also be found on the Herbalife website available at 
http://company.herbalife.com/sponsorships/ (accessed on 17 May 2018). 
2 Cullen ‘Herbalife soars after dodging pyramid scheme tag in FTC settlement’                                                                 
15 July 2016 available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/herbalife-soars-dodging-pyramid-scheme-
143038125.html?guccounter=1 (accessed on 19 April 2018). 
3 Ibid. 
4 The NCC is an organ of state assigned with the task of ensuring enforcement of the CPA. The NCC 
and its role will be further discussed in Chapter 3.   
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In 2003, Woker wrote that pyramid schemes were on the rise in South Africa with more 
people falling victim to these schemes every day.5  She also pointed out that South 
Africa’s past, together with poverty and a high unemployment rate, creates a ‘fertile 
breeding ground for opportunists’.6 In 2009, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
(hereinafter referred to as the CPA) was passed as law.7 The Act deals specifically 
with pyramid and other unlawful schemes yet it seems that South Africa continues to 
provide a fertile ground for those who wish to promote unlawful schemes. In 2016, the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) investigated 27 money scams. The Bank 
Supervision Department’s annual report revealed that 19 of these schemes had been 
carried over from previous years whilst the other eight were new.8  
The old adage 'if it sounds too good to be true it probably is' probably best describes 
pyramid schemes. Promoters entice people to join the scheme with false promises of 
making a lot of money. Consumers gravitate toward these schemes because of greed 
or gullibility. Hoexter JA said the following with regard to pyramid schemes:             
‘History. . . teaches us that in the human breast greed and gullibility are often 
partners. It is on these twin weaknesses that all confidence-tricksters trade; and 
not a few flourish’.9  
These schemes appear on the face of it to be more lucrative investment opportunities 
as opposed to conventional methods of investment.10 Consumers are attracted by the 
possibility of obtaining instant wealth and acquiring possessions such as lavish cars 
and houses, all while exercising minimal effort.11   
Pyramid schemes were recognised as a problem in South Africa long before the 
inception of the CPA. In 1980, conditions were imposed on the operation of these and 
other similar schemes by the DTI.12 This was followed by regulations adopted under 
                                                          
5 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 237. 
6 Ibid 238. 
7 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 1. 
8 Omarjee ‘SARB took on 27 scams in 2016 – report’ 26 May 2017 available at 
https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/sarb-took-on-27-scams-in-2016-report-
20170526 (accessed on 2 May 2018). 
9 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Insolvent Estate Botha t/a 'Trio Kulture' 1990 (2) SA 548 (A) at 
554D – E. 
10 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 237. 
11 GN 1134 of GG 20169 9/6/1999 4.  
12 Reg 469 of GG 6880 14/3/1980. 
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the Harmful Business Practices Act 71 of 1988 (this Act was later renamed the 
Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices Act)).  
The Harmful Business Practices Act was established to enable the Harmful Business 
Practices Committee (subsequently renamed the Consumer Affairs Committee) (‘the 
Committee’) to investigate harmful business practices. The Committee, following an 
investigation, could then make recommendations to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry.13 In some instances, the Minister would issue regulations which regulated 
the business practices to ensure that they did not harm consumers and in other 
instances, the Minister closed the business down completely, declaring it to be a 
harmful business practice.14 
At first the Committee investigated individual businesses which were subsequently 
declared to be harmful pyramid and other similar type schemes.15 Two businesses 
that were investigated by the Committee were Rainbow Business Club and Newport 
Business Club (Pty) Ltd.16 The Committee then conducted a general investigation into 
pyramid schemes, money multiplication schemes and chain letters which identified the 
hallmarks of such unlawful schemes.17 The Minister then issued regulations declaring 
that pyramid schemes, money multiplication schemes and chain letters were harmful 
business practices and that it was a criminal offence to participate in such a scheme.18 
Those regulations where then incorporated into the CPA namely in section 43(2)(b) 
and section 43(4)(a). 
 
1.2 Statement of purpose 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically examine how Herbalife operates in South 
Africa and to determine whether or not Herbalife is contravening South African 
legislation on pyramid schemes.  
                                                          
13 Woker ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 
promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31(2) Obiter 220. 
14 Ibid 219-220. 
15 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
2003 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 240. 
16 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999 5.  
17 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 240. 
18 Ibid.  
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In order to fulfil the purpose, section 43 of the CPA will be analysed and pyramid 
schemes will be compared and contrasted with legitimate multi-level marketing 
programmes such as Avon Products Inc. and Tupperware Brands Corporation.  
 
1.3 Rationale  
Although the CPA came into operation eight years ago, in 2011, many people are still 
unaware that participating in pyramid schemes is illegal.19 Pyramid schemes continue 
to operate in South Africa.20 These schemes take on many forms and sizes and each 
one can differ from the next.21 However, the common thread among pyramid schemes 
is that a few participants benefit at the expense of the majority of the participants. 
Those at the bottom of the pyramid often find themselves losing their investments. 
Promoters usually disappear without a trace, leaving participants with no means of 
recourse and no way to recoup their investment.22 
Herbalife is a successful business that operates throughout the world. The company 
operates in over 90 countries across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa 
and Asia Pacific.23 It began in South Africa in 1995 where it continues to operate.24 
However, Herbalife is often criticised for being a pyramid scheme and has been 
investigated in a number of different countries, most notably the United States of 
America where it has been the subject of an FTC investigation.25  Even in South Africa 
there have been allegations that Herbalife is an unlawful pyramid scheme. 
                                                          
19 Joroy 4440 CC v Potgieter 2016 (3) SA 465 (FB). 
20 Arde, ‘Pyramid scams thriving in SA’ 6 February 2016 available at https://www.iol.co.za/personal-
finance/pyramid-scams-thriving-in-sa-1980769 (accessed on 21 February 2018). 
21 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018). 
22 Paterson ‘Pyramid schemes and other related practices: What you need to know’ available at 
https://dommisseattorneys.co.za/blog/pyramid-schemes-and-other-related-practices-what-you-need-
to-know/ (accessed on 31 August 2018).  
23  Information regarding Herbalife is available on its website http://www.herbalife.com/global (accessed 
on 12th April 2018). 
24 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
phenomena and what the law is doing to protect consumers’ 15 July 2015 available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c62b13a4-d053-48d5-bef2-3b1ac7a85351 (accessed 
on 21 February 2018). 
25 Partnoy ‘Is Herbalife a Pyramid Scheme?’ June 2014, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/wall-streets-6-billion-mystery/361624/ 
(accessed on 18th April 2018). 
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Nevertheless, South Africans are still involved in Herbalife and, should it be found that 
the company is in fact a pyramid scheme, its members could lose their investment.  
The reason behind this dissertation is to determine whether or not Herbalife is a 
pyramid scheme under South African law thereby educating people who wish to join 
the company.  
 
1.4. Research questions 
This study intends to answer the following questions: 
1. What is a pyramid scheme and how can such schemes be identified? 
2. What is multi-level marketing and to what extent does legitimate multi-level    
    marketing differ from a pyramid scheme?                                        
3. What is the South African law on pyramid schemes? 
4. What is Herbalife and how does it operate? 
5. How does the United States of America view Herbalife? 
 
1.5. Methodology 
This research paper is solely desktop-based. Information is drawn mainly from 
textbooks, journal articles, government publications and internet sources. The CPA 
and other legislation will also be considered. 
 
1.6. Structure of the dissertation  
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to this mini-dissertation setting out the background 
to the topic followed by the statement of purpose and rationale. The research 
questions which will be answered in this dissertation are then listed and the research 
methodology which will be adopted is discussed. The chapter concludes with the 
structure of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 discusses the concepts of pyramid scheme and multi-level marketing and 
distinguishes between the two. This chapter will focus, in particular, on the hallmarks 
of a pyramid scheme. 
The focus of Chapter 3 is on the law governing pyramid schemes in South Africa. A 
brief history of the law will precede a critical examination of section 43 of the CPA. 
This chapter also includes an analysis of other relevant sections of the CPA. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the common law concept of fraud. 
Chapter 4 discusses Herbalife’s business model. The chapter will analyse the 
allegations that Herbalife operates as a pyramid scheme and will consider the 
investigation that took place in the United States, following which Herbalife was found 
not to be a pyramid scheme but it was required to make certain changes and to give 
certain assurances. A synopsis of the current allegations against Herbalife, in the 
United States, is also contained in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 looks at and examines Herbalife from a South African legal perspective. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study and contains recommendations for Herbalife.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PYRAMID SCHEMES AND MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the 1990s, the number of pyramid schemes rapidly increased,26 as did the 
international growth of multi-level marketing.27 It is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between an illegal pyramid scheme and a legitimate multi-level marketing 
programme.28 This chapter will explain the term pyramid scheme, differentiate 
between promotional and product-based schemes, discuss how pyramid schemes can 
be identified and consider the problems associated with these schemes. This 
discussion will be followed by an analysis of what constitutes multi-level marketing, 
the ‘legal cousin’ of pyramid schemes. 29  To better illustrate the concept of multi-level 
marketing, legitimate companies such as Avon Products Inc (Avon) and Tupperware 
Brands Corporation (Tupperware) will be considered. The chapter concludes with a 
test to help determine whether or not a particular scheme is a pyramid scheme. 
 
2.2 Pyramid schemes  
2.2.1 Hallmarks of a pyramid scheme 
Pyramid schemes can be diverse in nature but all pyramid schemes share common 
characteristics. These hallmarks can assist in identifying whether or not an investment 
opportunity is a legitimate business opportunity or a pyramid scheme. Where a 
pyramid scheme is involved, there are either no products or services for sale or those 
that are being sold have little or no value for the consumer.30 Promoters of the scheme 
                                                          
26 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets 2 ed 2007 
327. 
27 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 139. 
28 Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy Text and Materials on Regulating Consumer Markets 2 ed 2007 
327. 
29 Krige ‘Fields of Dreams, Fields of Schemes: Ponzi Finance and Multi-level Marketing in South Africa’ 
(2012) 82(1) Africa 70. 
30 Paterson ‘Pyramid schemes and other related practices: What you need to know’ available at 
https://dommisseattorneys.co.za/blog/pyramid-schemes-and-other-related-practices-what-you-need-
to-know/ (accessed on 31 August 2018).  
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also engage in false advertising regarding how valuable the product is,31 for example, 
they purport to sell miracle creams.32 Products are usually overpriced and incidental 
to the business opportunity.33 Distributors are encouraged to purchase large quantities 
of goods up-front and there is often no repurchase scheme for unsold goods.34  
Another tell-tale sign of a pyramid scheme is a complex commission structure. A 
complex commission structure is cause for concern when products or services are not 
sold to people outside the organisation.35 Schemes are also promoted as a get-rich-
quick investment with promoters falsifying or exaggerating financial figures and 
potential earnings.36  
Pyramid schemes are composed of various levels comprising a pyramid structure and 
those at the bottom of the pyramid benefit only after those at the top.37  Furthermore, 
(and possibly the main feature of a pyramid scheme) income is derived principally from 
the recruitment of new investors into the scheme with actual retail sales contributing 
minimally to a distributor’s earnings.38 This is sometimes known as a head-hunting 
fee.39  
Upon joining the scheme, members are required to make an investment.40 This is 
referred to as a joining fee.41 In order to recoup one’s own investment, a participant in 
a scheme needs to canvass new members who need to canvass new members and 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 
32 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
phenomena and what the law is doing to protect consumers’ 15 July 2015 available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c62b13a4-d053-48d5-bef2-3b1ac7a85351 (accessed 
on 21 February 2018). 
33 This feature of a pyramid scheme is discussed on the Facts About Herbalife website available at 
https://www.factsaboutherbalife.com/the-facts/the-herbalife-pyramid-scheme/ (accessed on 8 
November 2018).                                        
34 Clarke… et al Successful Network Marketing A South African Guide (1996) 63. 
35 This feature of a pyramid scheme is discussed on the Facts About Herbalife website available at 
https://www.factsaboutherbalife.com/the-facts/the-herbalife-compensation-plan/ (accessed on 8 
November 2018). 
36 Clarke … et al Successful Network Marketing A South African Guide (1996) 63. 
37 Paterson ‘Pyramid schemes and other related practices: What you need to know’ available at 
https://dommisseattorneys.co.za/blog/pyramid-schemes-and-other-related-practices-what-you-need-
to-know/ (accessed on 31 August 2018).  
38  Ibid.  
39 Clarke … et al Successful Network Marketing A South African Guide (1996) 63. 
40 Nhlapo ‘We're Still Falling For Ponzi And Pyramid Schemes’ 9 March 2018 available at 
https://www.huffingtonpost.co.za/2018/03/09/were-still-falling-for-ponzi-and-pyramid-
schemes_a_23381530/ (accessed on 31 August 2018). 
41 Albaum and Peterson ‘Multilevel (network) marketing: an objective view’ The Marketing Review 
(2011) 11(4) 352. 
9 
 
so forth.42 The following very basic example illustrates how this works: the founder of 
a pyramid scheme recruits five members, each of whom have to pay R500 to join the 
scheme.  They are then in turn required to recruit five other members each of whom 
pays R500. Provided they are able to recruit five members each, the first five recruits 
will each earn R2000 in profit.    
Again, assuming that the initial five recruits each recruit five more people, those 25 
new recruits need to each recruit five others in order to make R2000. Thus, there 
needs to be 125 new willing participants. Those at the subsequent level then need to 
sign up a further 725 people in order to generate a profit.43 Thus, the number of 
participants required for each new level to make a profit increases as the levels 
increase.  
Pyramid schemes are dependent on a constant inflow of new participants, a situation 
which is mathematically improbable because ‘there is a finite number of human beings 
to recruit’.44 The longer a scheme is in existence, the harder it is to find new 
members.45 Inevitably, there will come a time when there is an insufficient number of 
new recruits and the scheme cannot sustain itself. The scheme will collapse ‘when the 
inflow of funds no longer sustain[s] the outflow of extravagant returns to participants’.46 
Consequently, the majority of investors are financially at a loss and unable to recoup 
their investment.47  
In summary, pyramid schemes are fraudulent business ventures that mislead 
consumers as to the true nature of the scheme.48 In promoting the scheme, the 
                                                          
42 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf accessed on 22 May 2018. 
43 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
phenomena and what the law is doing to protect consumers’ 15 July 2015 available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c62b13a4-d053-48d5-bef2-3b1ac7a85351 (accessed 
on 21 February 2018). 
44 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 
45 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999. 
46 Fourie NO & Others v Edeling NO & Others 2005 (4) All SA 393 (SCA). 
47 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018). 
48 Mabe ‘Setting aside Transactions from Pyramid Schemes as Impeachable Dispositions under South 
African Insolvency Legislation’ (2016) 19 PER / PELJ 6. 
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organisers misrepresent potential earnings to potential recruits.49 Recruits are led to 
believe that financial success is attainable by participating in these schemes,50 
however, it is usually only those at the top of the pyramid, such as the initial organisers, 
who are enriched.51   
 
2.2.2 Promotional pyramid schemes and product-based pyramid schemes 
Pyramid schemes can be divided into two categories namely, promotional pyramid 
schemes and product-based pyramid schemes.52 Promotional pyramid schemes (also 
known as investment-based or naked pyramid schemes) 53 invite potential investors to 
join an organisation or club. Meetings are held during which investors are convinced 
to pay forward a sum of money to the promoter, money which can be recovered 
through recruiting more members.54 Because compensation is based solely on 
recruitment, promotional pyramid schemes are described as wealth transfer 
schemes55 and are generally regarded as illegal, fraudulent schemes.56 The FTC also 
classified these schemes as an unfair and deceptive practice.57  These were the 
original pyramid type schemes and it was because they were generally regarded as 
fraudulent (thus illegal) that promoters of such schemes started to evolve their 
schemes into schemes that sold products.58 
                                                          
49 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 141. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Hagan Crime Types and Criminals 2010 177. 
52 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 240. 
53 Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level Marketing Plans Versus Illegal 
Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 available on Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
54 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 240. 
55 Keep and Vander Nat ‘Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United States: An Historical 
Analysis’ (2014) 6(4) Journal of Historical Research in Marketing (forthcoming) 6. 
56 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 140. 
57 Taylor ‘The Case (for and) against Multi-level Marketing’ Consumer Awareness Institute 2011 
available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/trade-regulation-rule-
disclosure-requirements-and-prohibitions-concerning-business-opportunities-ftc.r511993-
00017%C2%A0/00017-57317.pdf (accessed on 17 April 2018). 
58 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 140. 
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Product-based pyramid schemes involve the selling of a product or service.59 
However, sales are usually only made internally (to those within the organisation) or 
to new recruits.60 
These schemes are complex and exist in multiple forms. In addition to recruiting 
others, distributors may be required to pay fees and/or purchase products or services 
up front or compensation could be calculated based on recruitment, with actual retail 
sales mostly or completely excluded from the equation.61  
The problem with product-based schemes is that they misrepresent to recruits and 
potential recruits the income that can be expected. As stated by Keep and Vander Nat, 
‘all [product-based schemes] claimed income levels well above what could realistically 
be achieved’.62 An additional problem is that distributors often end up with products 
they are unable to sell or return,63 products which in most cases have little to no 
value.64 
The introduction of products in pyramid schemes makes it difficult to distinguish 
between an illegal pyramid scheme and a legitimate MLM programme. However, even 
in schemes where there is a product involved, the primary focus is still on recruitment. 
Investors join the scheme with the intention of generating a profit and not because 
they believe in the product being sold.65 The product is of insignificant value to the 
consumer,66 and is used to detract from the fact that the business venture is a pyramid 
scheme.67  
 
                                                          
59 Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level Marketing Plans Versus Illegal 
Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 available on Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
60 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018). 
61 Keep and Vander Nat ‘Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United States: An Historical 
Analysis’ (2014) 6(4) Journal of Historical Research in Marketing (forthcoming) 6-9. 
62 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 140. 
63 Ibid 140-141. 
64 Woker ‘Section 43’ in Naude and Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(Original Service 2014) para 20. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018). 
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2.3 Multi-level marketing 
2.3.1 What is multi-level marketing? 
Multi-level marketing (MLM) is a legitimate form of direct selling,68 or retail 
distribution,69 which began in the 1940s.70 It is also known as network marketing, 
relationships selling and multi-level direct selling.71 It is an alternative business 
model72 suitable for entrepreneurs who are financially ill-equipped to start their own 
business or join a franchise because in most cases they are joining an already 
established business.73  Participants usually join MLM firms because of its associated 
benefits which include being able to work from home and work flexible hours whilst 
earning an income or supplementing their income.74 
MLM programmes are legal provided compensation is not derived primarily through 
recruitment. Furthermore, the firm must offer a tangible product or service to the         
public,75 ‘without requiring these consumers to pay anything extra or to join the MLM 
system’.76  Most MLM firms offer a variety of products and/or services,77 which, unlike 
pyramid schemes, have real value to purchasers.78 Product distribution usually takes 
place face-to-face with registered independent distributors meeting customers in 
                                                          
68 Woker ‘Section 43’ in Naude and Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(Original Service 2014) para 19. 
69 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 
70 Keep and Vander Nat ‘Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United States: An Historical 
Analysis’ (2014) 6(4) Journal of Historical Research in Marketing (forthcoming) 14. 
71 Deepalakshmi ‘Distributors perception towards marketing of direct selling products with special 
reference to Herbalife’ (2017) 2(4) International Journal of Academic Research and Development 361. 
72 Keep and Vander Nat ‘Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United States: An Historical 
Analysis’ (2014) 6(4) Journal of Historical Research in Marketing (forthcoming) 1. 
73 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 
74 Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level Marketing Plans Versus Illegal 
Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 available on Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
75 Krige ‘Fields of Dreams, Fields of Schemes: Ponzi Finance and Multi-level Marketing in South Africa’ 
(2012) 82(1) Africa 70. 
76 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018). 
77 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 139. 
78 Woker ‘Section 43’ in Naude and Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(Original Service 2014) para 21. 
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person.79 Sales can be done door-to-door, on a party plan basis (product parties) or 
may even be concluded telephonically.80 Different MLM programmes have different 
compensation plans,81 however, distributors are generally compensated for their own 
retail sales (the compensation value being the difference between retail price and cost 
price) as well as the sales concluded by members in their downline (that is, their direct 
and indirect recruits).82 A distributor’s own sales includes products purchased for 
personal consumption, a concept known as internal consumption.83 In addition, MLM 
marketers may sometimes receive commission for bringing in new recruits. This blurs 
the line between pyramid schemes and MLM firms but in the case of MLM, this 
commission is permitted in terms of the Direct Marketing Code of Conduct.84 
Distributors have a symbiotic relationship with their respective MLM companies.85 One 
of the functions of an MLM firm is to provide a product or service that is then sold by 
its distributors.86 The distributor may take on a dual role operating as both salesperson 
and sales manager.87 Being a salesperson requires, inter alia, informing consumers 
about the products and/or services and enabling them to purchase these, should they 
so wish. The role of a sales manager, on the other hand, involves recruiting others 
wanting to join the firm, helping them register as distributors and training them in 
                                                          
79 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 140. Registered independent 
distributors are also known as ‘independent sales agents, representatives, members, participants, or 
independent business owners’. Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level 
Marketing Plans Versus Illegal Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 
available on Thomson Reuters Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
80 Woker ‘Section 43’ in Naude and Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(Original Service 2014) para 19. 
81 Vander Nat and Keep ‘Marketing Fraud: An Approach for Differentiating Multilevel marketing from 
Pyramid Schemes’ (2002) 21(1) Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 140. 
82 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 
83 Peterson and Albaum ‘On the Ethicality of Internal Consumption in Multilevel Marketing’ (2007) 27(4) 
Journal of Personal Selling & Sales 317. 
84 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 243. 
85 Coughlan ‘FAQs on MLM Companies’ July 2012 available at 
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/FAQs%20on%2
0MLM%20Companies%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
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preparation for this role.88 The success of an MLM firm is dependent on the 
contributions of the distributors and the firm itself.89  
The structure of MLM firms also differ and may comprise of a single level or multiple 
levels. The number of levels is, however, generally limited and not indefinite as is the 
case with pyramid schemes.90  
 
2.3.2 Examples of MLM firms  
MLM firms vary considerably and span numerous different industries.91 Examples of 
well-known MLM firms include Avon and Tupperware. 
Avon is an international company that operates in the cosmetic industry.92 The 
company offers a range of products such as makeup, perfumes and jewellery.93 An 
Avon representative can earn commission in various ways.94 Firstly, through face-to-
face product sales. The amount of commission received depends on the order size 
but ranges from 20 to 40%. However, when a representative reaches a certain level 
(known as President’s Club) they can earn up to 50%.95 Secondly, commission can be 
earned via online sales (through a distributor’s personal Avon website) or a 
combination of face-to-face and online sales. Lastly, commission can be earned 
through leadership. Leadership involves recruiting others (essentially forming a 
downline) who then begin their own Avon businesses.96 There are different stages 
involved in the leadership programmes such as Advanced Unit Leader and Avon 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Albaum and Peterson ‘Multilevel (network) marketing: an objective view’ The Marketing Review 
(2011) 11(4) 351. 
91 Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level Marketing Plans Versus Illegal 
Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 available on Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
92 MarketLine ‘Company Profile Avon Products Inc.’ 13 October 2017 available on EBSCOhost web at 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ukzn.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=3&sid=da821dbd-aa36-
4370-b078-10addcd8cd0a%40pdc-v-sessmgr05 (accessed on 22 July 2018). 
93 Ibid. 
94 Information about the different ways an Avon representative can earn commission can be found on 
the Makeup Marketing Online website accessible on http://www.makeupmarketingonline.com/can-you-
make-money-selling-avon/ (accessed on 22 July 2018).  
95 Information on the different levels of commission in the Avon compensation structure can be found 
on the Makeup Marketing Online website available at http://www.sellingbeautyonline.com/avon-
commission-chart-2018/ (accessed on 22 July 2018). 
96 Information about the different ways an Avon representative can earn commission can be found on 
the Makeup Marketing Online website accessible on http://www.makeupmarketingonline.com/can-you-
make-money-selling-avon/ (accessed on 22 July 2018).  
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Executive Leader.97 A representative’s progress is determined by the number of 
recruits in his or her downline.98 
Tupperware is an internationally recognised brand that principally sells homeware, 
particularly kitchenware.99 In addition, the company sells beauty products by brands 
such as Avroy Shlain and BeautiControl.100 The various types of commission a 
Tupperware representative can earn are as follows: retail sales commission whereby 
distributors earn 25% commission on the products they have sold, bonuses on sales 
which are awarded to representatives who exceed a certain sales volume and lastly, 
commission on team performance which is awarded to managers and directors.101 
There are different levels through which a Tupperware representative can 
transcend.102 The first is the level of a consultant who earns income from personal 
sales, second is a manager whose income is based on personal sales and total team 
sales, third is a team leader whose income is calculated on personal sales, total team 
sales as well as sales of the group and finally, at the apex is the level of distributor 
whose income is based on organisation sales. 
As can be seen from the above two compensation plans, members in a legitimate 
MLM firm are primarily compensated through retail sales and not through the 
recruitment of new participants into the selling plan. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 Charissa ‘Avon MLM Review-Avon MLM Explained’ 12 October 2015 available at 
http://www.marikinavalley.com/avon/avon-mlm-review-avon-mlm-
explained/#avon%20compensation%20plan (accessed on 22 July 2018). 
98 Ibid. 
99 MarketLine ‘Company Profile Tupperware Brands Corporation’ 13 July 2018 available on 
EBSCOhost web at 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ukzn.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=4&sid=9ddf832a-303d-
4d29-bf70-5553931a5812%40sessionmgr4007 (accessed on 31 August 2018).  
100 Ibid. 
101 Information on Tupperware’s compensation plan can be found on the MLM Tips and Advice website 
available at https://www.mlmtipsandadvice.com.au/tupperware-compensation-plan/.  
102 Information of Tupperware’s business model can be found on the Tupperware Brand’s website 
available at https://ir.tupperwarebrands.com/investor-story/business-model.  
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2.3.3 Criticisms of MLM  
The MLM model is not without criticism. There are those who oppose the idea claiming 
that all forms of MLM should be prohibited and not just pyramid schemes.103 Critics 
argue that MLM programmes are unethical in that distributors pressurise friends and 
relatives to purchase the firms products, ‘inflate earning claims during recruiting’ and 
‘sell under the pretext of a party’.104  However, despite these criticisms, MLM remains 
a legitimate means of direct selling. 
 
2.4 Pyramid schemes versus MLM 
Although all pyramid schemes are MLM companies, not all MLM companies are illegal 
pyramid schemes.105 To help distinguish between the two, Albaum and Peterson have 
established a four-question test, the answers to which will determine whether or not 
an organisation is a pyramid scheme.106 Firstly, one must identify the product or 
service that is being sold. Is it an actual product or service or merely ‘the right to sell 
a product or service’?107 Secondly, the joining fee needs to be considered. Is the 
amount that a participant is required to pay upon entering the organisation fair and 
reasonable? Is it proportionate to what the participant receives in return? Thirdly, is 
there inventory loading? Inventory loading is the practice whereby a company 
pressurises recruits to purchase products, often more products than which they are 
capable of selling.108 Finally, does the MLM company have a buyback policy? That is, 
will the company buy back the unsold stock of a distributor who wishes to exit the 
company, thereby enabling the distributor to recoup some of their money?109 If an 
actual product or service is being sold, the joining fee is reasonable as well as fair, the 
                                                          
103 Practical Law Commercial Transactions ‘Legitimate Multi-Level Marketing Plans Versus Illegal 
Pyramid Schemes’ 2018 Practical Law Practice Note w-011-5206 available on Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw (accessed on 13 July 2018). 
104 Albaum and Peterson ‘Multilevel (network) marketing: an objective view’ The Marketing Review 
(2011) 11(4) 355. 
105 Walsh ‘Multi-level Marketing Skirts Legal Lines’ Consumers’ Research Magazine (1999) 82(6) 13. 
106 Albaum and Peterson ‘Multilevel (network) marketing: an objective view’ The Marketing Review 
(2011) 11 (4) 352. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Valentine ‘International Monetary Funds Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks’ 
13 May 1998 available at https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes (accessed 
on 9 July 2018).  
109 Attri and Chaturvedi ‘Study of Consumer Perceptions of the Products Sold Through Multilevel 
Marketing’ Management Research Journal (2011) 5 (4) 102. 
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company does not force recruits to purchase products and has a buyback policy, then 
the company in question is not a pyramid scheme.110 
 
2.5 Conclusion   
Pyramid schemes and MLM are two distinct concepts but are often confused because 
of their similar hierarchical structure. The differences, however, lie in how they operate. 
The key feature of a pyramid scheme is that compensation is primarily derived through 
recruitment. Although MLM firms may sometimes compensate its members for 
recruiting others, this is not the primary source of compensation. MLM firms are more 
retail-focused with members predominantly generating an income from the sale of 
products and/or services offered by the firm. These products and services have real 
value to the consumer, unlike those which some pyramid schemes purport to sell. In 
addition, pyramid schemes often require its participants to pay unreasonable joining 
fees, pressurise them into buying products and do not cater for inventory buyback 
when a distributor wishes to leave the business.  
MLM programmes provide a legitimate business opportunity for those wanting to earn 
an income whilst a pyramid scheme is merely ‘a money-transfer scheme in which the 
foreseen losses of the vast majority become winnings for a small minority at the top of 
the recruitment structure.’111 The continuous cycle of taking from Peter to pay Paul is 
unsustainable and mathematically improbable, given that there are a finite number of 
human beings to recruit.112 Thus, whilst MLM companies are legitimate, pyramid 
schemes remain unlawful. The next chapter will deal with the South African law on 
pyramid schemes. 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 Albaum and Peterson ‘Multilevel (network) marketing: an objective view’ The Marketing Review 
(2011) 11(4) 352.  
111 Keep and Vander Nat ‘Multilevel Marketing and Pyramid Schemes in the United States: An Historical 
Analysis’ (2014) 6(4) Journal of Historical Research in Marketing (forthcoming) 10. 
112 Krige ‘Fields of Dreams, Fields of Schemes: Ponzi Finance and Multi-level Marketing in South Africa’ 
(2012) 82(1) Africa 70-71. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PYRAMID SCHEMES AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To help combat the problem of pyramid schemes discussed in Chapter 2, the South 
African government first introduced conditions regulating pyramid schemes.113 
However, these regulations were regarded as being cumbersome and no reported 
decisions based on these regulations appear to exist.114 The legislature subsequently 
enacted legislation governing pyramid schemes. The two main pieces of legislation in 
this regard are the Harmful Business Practices Act (renamed the Consumer Affairs 
(Unfair Business Practices) Act) and the CPA.115 Both these Acts will be considered 
in this Chapter with the focus being on the CPA and section 43 in particular. Other 
relevant sections of the CPA will also be discussed, followed by a brief discussion of 
the common law position on fraud.  
 
3.2 The Harmful Business Practices Act /The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business 
Practices Act) 
The purpose of this Act was to prohibit or control certain business practices.116 The 
Act was first introduced in 1988 and was then amended significantly in 1999. Before 
the amendments, the Act dealt with harmful business practices, but the Amendment 
Act widened the scope of the Act by introducing the concept of an unfair business 
practice.  Hence, it was no longer necessary to show that a particular business practice 
was harmful, it was only necessary to show that the business practice was unfair to 
                                                          
113 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 238. 
114 Ibid.  
115 Other pieces of legislation regarding pyramid schemes include the Banks Act 94 of 1990 and the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS) 37 of 2002. These pieces of legislation relate 
to pyramid schemes because the Banks Act regulates the taking of money from the general public and 
the FAIS Act regulates the giving of financial advice.  A discussion of these aspects of pyramid schemes 
is beyond the scope of this mini-dissertation therefore, this dissertation will only deal with the Harmful 
Business Practices Act (Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act)) and the CPA.  
116 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation on Consumer Protection’ available at 
media.withtank.com/6adcc510b8.ppt (accessed on 16 August 2018).  
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consumers. Section 1 of the Amendment Act defines an unfair business practice 
(previously termed a harmful business practice)117 as                                                                            
‘any business practice which, directly or indirectly, has or is likely to have the 
effect of –  
(a) harming the relations between businesses and consumers;  
(b) unreasonably prejudicing any consumer;  
(c) deceiving any consumer; or  
(d) unfairly affecting any consumer’.  
To help fulfil its purpose, the Act established the Business Practices Committee (which 
under the Amendment Act was renamed the Consumer Affairs Committee 
(CAFCOM)).  
The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act was a piece of enabling 
legislation conferring certain powers upon CAFCOM. This included powers to conduct 
investigations.118 The National Office of Consumer Protection (OCP) acted on behalf 
of CAFCOM and was empowered to conduct investigations (both formal and informal) 
into alleged unfair business practices.119 Investigators required CAFCOM’s approval 
in order to conduct a section 4 (informal) or section 8 (formal) investigation.120  
Section 4(1)(c) of the Act provided for preliminary investigations. These investigations 
were informal and the details were not revealed publicly.121 These investigations were 
conducted when it was believed that there was a harmful business practice or there 
was a possibility that one could arise.122 The purpose of such investigation was to 
determine how the business in question operated,123 and to establish whether there 
was a need for a section 8(1)(a) investigation to be concluded.124 If the results of the 
investigation confirmed the existence or potential existence of an unfair business 
                                                          
117 Janse van Rensburg and Another v Minister of Trade and Industry and Another (CCT13/99) [2000] 
ZACC 18 at paragraph 9.  
118 GN 2967 of GG 27125, 20/12/2004, 9. 
119 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation on Consumer Protection’ available at 
media.withtank.com/6adcc510b8.ppt (accessed on 16 August 2018). 
120 Ibid. 
121 GN 2967 of GG 27125, 20/12/2004, 9.  
122 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999 4-5. 
123 GN 2967 of GG 27125, 20/12/2004, 9.  
124 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999, 5.  
20 
 
practice, the OCP would convey this to CAFCOM.125 As per section 9 of the Act, 
CAFCOM had the option of negotiating with any person or entity in order to try and 
reach an arrangement wherein the offending party agreed to stop engaging in the 
unfair conduct. If, however, CAFCOM’s attempts at negotiation were unsuccessful, a 
section 8(1)(a) investigation could ensue.126 A section 4(1)(c) investigation was not, 
however, mandatory. If prima facie evidence suggested that an unfair business 
practice was being conducted, the Committee could forgo the section 4(1)(c) 
investigation and immediately pursue a section 8(1)(a) investigation.127 
Unlike section 4(1)(c) investigations, section 8(1)(a) investigations were formal and 
notice thereof had to be published in the Government Gazette.128 Section 8(1)(a) 
investigations were also known as particular investigations because the allegedly 
unfair business practices of particular entities, or unfair business practices which could 
arise in future,129 were the subject of the investigation.130 Section 8(1)(b) made 
provision for formal investigations that were more general in nature. In terms of this 
section, ‘any business practice being applied by persons in general for the purposes 
of creating or maintaining a harmful business practice’ could be investigated.131 
These investigations were conducted either because the Committee took the initiative, 
upon receipt of a complaint by the public, or if the Committee received an instruction 
from the Minister of Trade and Industry because the Minister believed there was a 
need to conduct such an investigation.132 
A key difference between both the section 8 investigations is that orders made in 
respect of section 8(1)(a) investigations applied only to those whose business 
practices had been investigated while Ministerial orders made in response to section 
                                                          
125 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Consumer Affairs Committee Annual Report 2008/09’ available 
at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/DTI_cafcom_annual%20report_11022010.pdf (accessed on 15 
November 2018).  
126 Ibid. 
127 GN 188 of GG 34174, 31/03/2011, 7  
128 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Consumer Affairs Committee Annual Report 2008/09’ available 
at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/DTI_cafcom_annual%20report_11022010.pdf (accessed on 15 
November 2018).  
129 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999 4. 
130 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Consumer Affairs Committee Annual Report 2008/09’ available 
at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/DTI_cafcom_annual%20report_11022010.pdf (accessed on 15 
November 2018).  
131 GN 1134 of 20169 9/6/1999 4. 
132 Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 103-104. 
21 
 
8(1)(b) investigations applied to all those who were guilty of engaging in the particular 
practice that was investigated.133   
A host of general and specific investigations were conducted over a number of 
years.134  Ultimately, the Committee concluded that there were three main types of 
schemes which had the potential to cause harm to consumers: pyramid promotional 
schemes, money revolving schemes and chain letters.135 These schemes were 
declared to be harmful business practices by the Minister.136 Both the act of 
establishing and participating in a pyramid scheme was prohibited.137  If compensation 
from a scheme was not derived from the services the scheme offered or the products 
it sold, this was contrary to the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act. Any 
person who was convicted of promoting or participating in such a scheme could be 
subject to a penalty not exceeding R200 000 and/or imprisonment for no longer than 
two years.138 
CAFCOM presented reports to the Minster following which the Minister could issue a 
notice in the Government Gazette suspending the practice pending the finalisation of 
the investigation.139 If the Committee found that a practice was unfair, it made 
recommendations to the Minister who had various powers under section 12 of the Act. 
The Minister, after consideration of those recommendations, could elect to either 
accept or reject the recommendations.140 If the Minister chose to accept the 
recommendations, an order was published in the Government Gazette.141  The 
Minister could declare a practice unlawful if it was unfair or contrary to the interest of 
the public.142 Furthermore, the Minister could direct any person to refrain from 
                                                          
133 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Consumer Affairs Committee Annual Report 2008/09’ available 
at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/DTI_cafcom_annual%20report_11022010.pdf (accessed on 15 
November 2018).  
134 For an example of a specific investigation see the investigation into the business practices of Zhauns 
Group of Companies in GN 188 of GG 34174, 31/03/2011. For an example of a general investigation 
see GN 469 of GG 28691, 30/03/2006.  
135 Woker ‘If it Sounds too Good to be True it probably Is: Pyramid Schemes and other related Frauds’ 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 240. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation on Consumer Protection’ available at 
media.withtank.com/6adcc510b8.ppt (accessed on 16 August 2018). 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Woker ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 
promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31(2) Obiter 219. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation on Consumer Protection’ available at 
media.withtank.com/6adcc510b8.ppt (accessed on 16 August 2018). 
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perpetuating the practice directly or indirectly.143 The Minister’s power to order that an 
unfair business practice be stopped could, however, only be exercised after a section 
8(1)(a) investigation and not after a preliminary investigation.144 Decisions made by 
the Minister could be appealed by those affected.145 
As can be seen from the above discussion, CAFCOM’s power was limited to just 
investigation and recommendations. CAFCOM itself could not order any redress for 
consumers who had been harmed by any business practices. If there was a breach of 
the Minister’s orders, the matter had to be referred to the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).146 However, consumer issues 
were often neglected by these authorities as there were (and still are) more pressing 
criminal issues that warranted the attention of these enforcement agencies.147  
The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act was the forerunner to the 
CPA.148 Although the CPA repealed and replaced this Act,149 it has influenced the 
contents of the CPA.150  The discussion above therefore provides a useful context to 
section 43 of the CPA which now governs pyramid schemes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
143 This includes ‘advertising, becoming a party to arrangements, deriving interest or income etc.’ Ibid.  
144 GN 2967 of GG 27125, 20/12/2004, 9. 
145 Department of Trade and Industry ‘Presentation on Consumer Protection’ available at 
media.withtank.com/6adcc510b8.ppt (accessed on 16 August 2018). 
146 Woker ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 
promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31(2) Obiter 220. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 103. 
149 Imperial Group (Pty) Ltd t/a Auto Niche Bloemfontein v MEC: Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism Free State Government and Others (A169/2014) [2016] ZAFSHC 
105 at paragraph 28.  
150 ‘70% of the contents of the [Consumer Protection] Act are not new and derives from the repeal, 
consolidation and re-enactment of useful provisions in existing legislation’. This includes the Consumer 
Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act. Department of Trade and Industry ‘Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008’ available at https://www.insurancegateway.co.za/download/1310 (accessed on 27 August 
2018).  
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3.3 The CPA   
3.3.1 Background   
The CPA was signed into law on 24 April 2009,151 and came into effect on 31 March 
2011.152 The CPA is an attempt to consolidate South African consumer law,153 and  is 
regarded as ‘a single comprehensive legal framework for consumer protection’.154 It is 
a step toward bringing South African legislation in line with international consumer 
rights.155 The purposes of the CPA include protecting consumers from ‘deceptive, 
misleading, unfair or fraudulent conduct’,156 promoting fair business practices157 and 
prohibiting ‘certain unfair marketing and business practices’.158 
Chapter 2 contains eight fundamental rights which consumers have. Part F of Chapter 
2 deals with a consumer’s right to fair and honest dealing. Section 43 (which covers 
pyramid and related schemes) falls under this part.  
 
3.3.2 The CPA and pyramid schemes 
The first important point to note about section 43 is that the schemes listed in section 
43 are prohibited, not regulated.159 In other words, there are no prescribed 
requirements which, if complied with, will render the schemes lawful.  
Section 43(2)(b) expressly prohibits pyramid schemes. The section reads as follows: 
‘a person must not directly or indirectly promote, or knowingly join, enter or 
participate in – 
… 
(b) a pyramid scheme, as described in subsection (4) 
… 
                                                          
151 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 1. 
152 Joroy 4440 CC v Potgieter 2016 (3) SA 465 (FB).  
153 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 3. 
154 Havenga … et al General Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2010) 483. 
155 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 1. 
156 Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 102. 
157 Ibid. 
158 As mentioned at the outset of the CPA.  
159 Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 140. 
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or cause any other person to do so’.  
The words ‘must not’ indicate that it is mandatory that persons abstain from becoming 
involved in pyramid schemes. The prohibition relates to both the participation in and 
promotion of a scheme. The first part of section 43(2)(b) ‘a person must not directly or 
indirectly promote, or knowingly join, enter or participate in…’ and the last part ‘or 
cause any other person to do so’ is regarded as the ‘required degree of involvement’ 
whilst a pyramid scheme (listed in paragraph (b)) will be the ‘identified activity’.160 Thus 
if a person has the required degree of involvement in relation to the identified activity 
(that is, if they promote, or knowingly join, enter or participate or cause another person 
to promote, knowingly join, enter or participate in a pyramid scheme) they will be guilty 
of engaging in prohibited conduct.  
In terms of section 43(4) of the CPA,  
           ‘an arrangement, agreement, practice or scheme is a pyramid scheme if—  
(a) participants in the scheme receive compensation derived primarily from their 
respective recruitment of other persons as participants, rather than from the 
sale of any goods or services; or  
(b) the emphasis in the promotion of the scheme indicates an arrangement or 
practice contemplated in paragraph (a).’ 
The CPA definition above is centred around the most notable hallmark of a pyramid 
scheme. That is, pyramid schemes are focussed on the recruitment of more 
participants in the scheme as opposed to retail sales.161 
The terms ‘consideration’ and ‘participant’ used in relation to pyramid schemes are 
defined in section 43(1)(a) and (b) respectively.  
The definition of consideration is the same as that contained in section 1 with a few 
exceptions. 162  The term consideration excludes: 
                                                          
160 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law in South Africa 2 ed (2017) 176. 
161 Woker ‘Section 43’ in Naude and Eiselen (eds) Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act 
(Original Service 2014) para 15. 
162 Under section 1 the term consideration is defined as ‘anything of value given and accepted in 
exchange for goods or services, including— (a) money, property, a cheque or other negotiable 
instrument, a token, a ticket, electronic credit, credit, debit or electronic chip or similar object; (b) labour, 
barter or other goods or services; (c) loyalty credit or award, coupon or other right to assert a claim; or 
(d) any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or assurance, irrespective of its apparent or 
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‘(i) the purchase of any goods at cost to be used in making sales, or not for 
resale;  
(ii) the purchase of any goods in exchange for which the seller of those goods 
offers to repurchase the participant’s products under reasonable commercial 
terms; and 
(iii) the participant’s time and effort in pursuit of sales or recruiting activities’.163 
A participant is ‘a person who is admitted to a scheme for consideration’.164 
Participation includes involvement as an organiser or promoter of a scheme, consumer 
involvement by way of joining the scheme as well as causing other persons to 
participate in the scheme.165 In pyramid schemes, the participative role of those 
involved often changes. People usually join the scheme as recruits and then they 
themselves become recruiters.166 Any form of participation in pyramid schemes is 
illegal and will constitute a breach of the CPA.167  
Other key terms employed in the definition of pyramid scheme are ‘goods’, ‘services’ 
and ‘promotion’.  
The word ‘goods’ as defined in section 1 of the CPA includes:  
‘(a) anything marketed for human consumption;  
(b) any tangible object not otherwise contemplated in paragraph (a), including 
any medium on which anything is or may be written or encoded;  
(c) any literature, music, photograph, motion picture, game, information, data, 
software, code or other intangible product written or encoded on any medium, 
or a licence to use any such intangible product;  
                                                          
intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred directly or indirectly, or involves only the supplier and 
consumer or other parties in addition to the supplier and consumer’.  
163 Section 43(1)(a) of the CPA.  
164 Section 43(1)(b) of the CPA. 
165 Van Eeden A Guide to the Consumer Protection Act (2009) 140-141. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Participation in a pyramid scheme may also contravene other legislation such as the Banks Act 94 
of 1990 and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. Harban ‘Ponzi and 
pyramid schemes: Participation is illegal even if promoted by a lawyer’ The Regulatory Debates 7 ed 
March 2018 available at http://www.cgso.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Final-Regulatory-
Debates-March-2018.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2018). 
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(d) a legal interest in land or any other immovable property, other than an 
interest that falls within the definition of ‘service’ in this section; and  
(e) gas, water and electricity’.168 
The definition of ‘service’ as contained in the Act can be summarised as  
‘work performed by a person for the direct or indirect benefit of another; 
education, information, advice or consultation, banking or similar financial 
services,169 transportation of goods or an individual; provision of 
accommodation, entertainment or access to entertainment, access to electronic 
communication infrastructure, access or a right of access to an event, premises, 
activity or facility or access to or use of property in terms of a rental. Service 
also includes the right of occupancy of, or power or privilege over, land or 
immovable property, and the rights of a franchisee in terms of a franchise 
agreement provided for in the Act’.170 
The word ‘promote’ means to—  
‘(a) advertise, display or offer to supply any goods or services in the ordinary 
course of business, to all or part of the public for consideration;                        
(b) make any representation in the ordinary course of business that could 
reasonably be inferred as expressing a willingness to supply any goods or 
services for consideration; or  
(c) engage in any other conduct in the ordinary course of business that may 
reasonably be construed to be an inducement or attempted inducement to a 
person to engage in a transaction’.  
It is presumed that when interpreting the meaning of the word ‘advertise’ as contained 
in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘promote’, courts will look to the definition of 
                                                          
168 The term ‘goods’ encompasses a variety of items. Under the definition, ‘bread, compact discs (CDs), 
electronic appliances and books’ can be classified as goods. Havenga … et al General Principles of 
Commercial Law 7 ed (2010) 486. 
169 Excluded from the ambit of the definition of service are services or advice dealt with under the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 or services covered under the Long-term 
Insurance Act 52 of 1998 or the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998. The CPA is, however, applicable 
to the marketing of financial services. Ibid.  
170 The term service is not confined to the activities listed above. Havenga … et al General Principles 
of Commercial Law 7 ed (2010) 486. 
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advertisement provided in section 1 of the Act.171 The use of the verb ‘supply’ in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) when used ‘in relation to goods, includes sell, rent, exchange 
and hire in the ordinary course of business for consideration’172 and when used                         
‘in relation to services, means to sell the services, or to perform or cause them to be 
performed or provided, or to grant access to any premises, event, activity or facility in 
the ordinary course of business for consideration’.173  
To promote a pyramid scheme is unlawful. Thus, if someone, in the ordinary course 
of business, advertises, displays, offers to supply or whose conduct indicates a 
willingness to supply, goods or services, for consideration, or induces or attempts to 
induce others to engage in the scheme, they will be guilty of unlawful conduct on the 
basis of promoting a prohibited scheme.  
In addition to the schemes expressly classified in section 43 as being prohibited, 
section 43(2)(d) read with section 43(6) empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry 
to declare any arrangement, agreement, practice or scheme as prohibited if the 
purpose or effect of such scheme is similar to a scheme mentioned in section 43(2)(a)-
(c), for example, a pyramid scheme.174 Participating in a scheme declared prohibited 
by the Minister is also unlawful. 
 
3.3.3 Other relevant provisions 
In addition to section 43, the CPA contains numerous other provisions prohibiting 
unfair marketing and business practices. The CPA also contains sections which aim 
to fulfil its goal of protecting consumers from ‘deceptive, misleading, unfair or 
fraudulent conduct’175 and to safeguard consumers against ‘unconscionable, unfair, 
                                                          
171 Van Eeden and Barnard Consumer Protection Law in South Africa 2 ed (2017) 44. Advertisement is 
defined as ‘any direct or indirect visual or oral communication transmitted by any medium, or any 
representation or reference written, inscribed, recorded, encoded upon or embedded within any 
medium, by means of which a person seeks to— (a) bring to the attention of all or part of the public— 
(i) the existence or identity of a supplier; or (ii) the existence, nature, availability, properties, advantages 
or uses of any goods or services that are available for supply, or the conditions on, or prices at, which 
any goods or services are available for supply; (b) promote the supply of any goods or services; or (c) 
promote any cause’.  
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 The Minister must declare the scheme as prohibited by means of a regulation which is published in 
compliance with section 120 of the CPA. Ibid 176. 
175 Section 3(1)(d)(ii). 
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unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade practices’.176  Sections 29, 40, and 
41 are of particular relevance to this dissertation as well as sections 48, 51, 52 and 69 
(insofar as it relates to sections 29, 40 or 41).  
Section 29 addresses the general standards for the marketing of goods and services. 
According to section 29, 
‘a producer, importer, distributor, retailer or service provider must not market 
any goods or services—  
(a) in a manner that is reasonably likely to imply a false or misleading 
representation concerning those goods or services, as contemplated in section 
41; or  
(b) in a manner that is misleading, fraudulent or deceptive in any way 
…’.  
Subsection (b) goes on to list examples of marketing which may constitute misleading, 
fraudulent or deceptive conduct. It is apparent from subsection (a) that that provision 
has to be read with section 41.  
As a whole, section 41 deals with the regulation of false, misleading or deceptive 
representations.177 Under section 51(1)(i), a supplier is prohibited from concluding a 
transaction or agreement if the ‘general purpose or effect [thereof] is to mislead or 
deceive the consumer’.178  
Section 41 reads as follows: 
‘(1) In relation to the marketing of any goods or services, the supplier must not, 
by words or conduct—  
(a) directly or indirectly express or imply a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation concerning a material fact to a consumer; 
                                                          
176 Section 3(1)(d)(i).  
177 Stoop ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and Procedural Fairness in Consumer Contracts’ 
(2015) 18(4) PER/PELJ 1100.  
178 This section echoes s4(5)(b) which states that ‘in any dealings with a consumer in the ordinary 
course of business, a person must not… engage in any conduct that is unconscionable, misleading or 
deceptive, or that is reasonably likely to mislead or deceive’.  
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(b) use exaggeration, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact, or fail to 
disclose a material fact if that failure amounts to a deception; or  
(c) fail to correct an apparent misapprehension on the part of a consumer, 
amounting to a false, misleading or deceptive representation, or permit or 
require any other person to do so on behalf of the supplier.  
(2) A person acting on behalf of a supplier of any goods or services must not—  
…  
(b) engage in any conduct that the supplier is prohibited from engaging in under 
subsection (1)’.  
Subsection (3) provides a list of guidelines as to what can be regarded as a false, 
misleading or deceptive representation, however, this list is not exhaustive.179 
Section 41 is a codification of the common law and it places emphasis on procedural 
fairness in contracts. Section 41(1)(a)-(c) lists the factors which affect procedural 
fairness.180 
Section 41(2) indicates that it is not just the supplier who is prohibited from engaging 
in the conduct described in section 41(1). The prohibition also extends to any person 
acting on the supplier’s behalf.181 
Section 48 of the CPA deals with unfair, unreasonable or unjust contract terms. The 
relevant parts of that section are: 
‘(1) A supplier must not— 
… 
(b) market any goods or services, or negotiate, enter into or administer a 
transaction or an agreement for the supply of any goods or services, in a 
manner that is unfair, unreasonable or unjust; 
                                                          
179 Stoop ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and Procedural Fairness in Consumer Contracts’ 
(2015) 18(4) PER/PELJ 1101.  
180 Hawthorne ‘Public governance: Unpacking the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 
THRHR 358.  
181 Stoop ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and Procedural Fairness in Consumer Contracts’ 
(2015) 18(4) PER/PELJ 1100.  
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… 
(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), a transaction or agreement, 
a term or condition of a transaction or agreement, or a notice to which a term 
or condition is purportedly subject, is unfair, unreasonable or unjust if— 
… 
(c) the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation, 
as contemplated in section 41 or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf 
of the supplier, to the detriment of the consumer; 
…’. 
Thus, if a consumer relies on a false, misleading or deceptive representation conveyed 
by the supplier or by someone acting on the supplier’s behalf and that reliance 
negatively impacts the consumer, such a term or contract will be unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust.  
With regard to the latter part of section 48(2)(c), a statement of opinion does not have 
to be false, misleading or deceptive to amount to an unfair term or contract. If a 
statement concerning a material fact ultimately caused detriment to the consumer, it 
can be declared as being unfair.182  
Section 40 of the CPA covers unconscionable conduct. In terms of this section, 
‘(1) A supplier or an agent of the supplier must not use physical force against a 
consumer, coercion, undue influence, pressure, duress or harassment, unfair 
tactics or any other similar conduct, in connection with any—  
(a) marketing of any goods or services;  
(b) supply of goods or services to a consumer;  
(c) negotiation, conclusion, execution or enforcement of an agreement to supply 
any goods or services to a consumer;  
…   
                                                          
182 Ibid 1101.  
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(2) In addition to any conduct contemplated in subsection (1), it is 
unconscionable for a supplier knowingly to take advantage of the fact that a 
consumer was substantially unable to protect the consumer’s own interests 
because of physical or mental disability, illiteracy, ignorance, inability to 
understand the language of an agreement, or any other similar factor’.  
 
Like section 41, section 40 is also concerned with procedural fairness, specifically, 
how consent was obtained.183 Section 40 deals with unconscionable conduct of a 
supplier or a supplier’s agent. It gives effect to the CPA’s aim to protect consumers 
from ‘unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust or otherwise improper trade 
practices’.184  
According to section 1 of the CPA, when the word unconscionable is used in relation 
to any conduct, it means ‘having a character contemplated in section 40; or otherwise 
unethical or improper to a degree that would shock the conscience of a reasonable 
person’. This definition is simplified by the DTI which states that ‘unconscionable 
conduct refers to behaviour that is unethical or improper’.185 According to Du Plessis, 
for conduct to be unconscionable, a substantial amount of impropriety must exist.186 
The scope of section 40 is quite broad because it applies not only to the listed conduct 
but to ‘any other similar conduct as well’.187 Thus unconscionable conduct may also 
include contractual negotiations which take place despite no serious or bona fide 
intention to conclude a contract, an abuse of one’s right to withdraw one’s offer and 
overlooking the fact that one might not be able to perform in future.188 
                                                          
183 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 24.  
184 Section 3(1)(d)(i).  
185 Department of Trade and Industry ‘The Consumer Protection Act Your Guide to Consumer Rights 
& How to Protect Them’ 23 November 2016 available at 
https://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/acts/CP_Brochure.pdf (accessed on 12 November 
2018).  
186 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 25.  
187 Ibid 26. 
188 Hawthorne ‘Public governance: Unpacking the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 
THRHR 355. 
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Section 40(1) refers to a situation in which a consumer cannot exercise their will freely 
because of the conduct of the supplier or the supplier’s agent. This is regardless of 
whether or not the supplier or the agent engaged in the conduct knowingly.189 
It is necessary to understand each form of conduct stipulated in section 40(1) in order 
to understand what amounts to unconscionable conduct.190 Absolute force refers to 
physical force but could also encompass threats of physical force, however, this may  
be equivalent to coercion or duress.191 Where an agreement was concluded because 
of absolute force, the agreement will be void ab initio.192  
Du Plessis points out that coercion is a foreign concept with no established definition 
in South African contract law.193 According to the Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, 
coercion means ‘forcible constraint or restraint, moral or physical; compulsion’.194  
Therefore Du Plessis argues that the word coercion is redundant because of the 
inclusion of the word duress which is a concept that is known in South African law.195 
In the case of duress, it is acceptable for a person to have exercised their will. The 
focus here is on how fear was instilled, and consent obtained. Duress involves the use 
of unlawful threats to induce the conclusion of a contract.196  
Undue influence was defined in the case of Preller and Others v Jordaan.197 It is 
essentially a situation in which one party acquires an influence over the other and such 
influence impairs the latter’s resistance with the result that they cannot exercise their 
own will.198 The influence is used to conclude a transaction that is to the weaker party’s 
                                                          
189 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 26.  
190 This list is not, however, exhaustive. Moore Stephens ‘Consumer Protection Act guide’ available at 
https://southafrica.moorestephens.com/MediaLibsAndFiles/media/southafricaweb.moorestephens.co
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191 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 27.  
192 Jacobs, Stoop and Van Niekerk ‘Fundamental Consumer Rights Under the Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008: A Critical Overview and Analysis’ (2010) 13 (3) PER/PELJ 347. 
193 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 27-28. 
194 Marckwardt, Cassidy and McMillan (eds) Webster Comprehensive Dictionary International Edition 
(1977) Vol. 1: 255.  
195 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 27.  
196 Ibid 29.  
197 1956 (1) SA 483 (A).  
198 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 28. 
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detriment and is a transaction that the weaker party would not have ordinarily 
consented to. Where undue influence is the cause of a contract, the contract is 
voidable at the election of the consumer.199  
Du Plessis notes that suppliers exert ‘pressure’ on consumers in order to persuade 
them to act in a particular way.200 Suppliers appeal to a customer’s insecurities and 
fears, however, these attempts by suppliers are usually harmless. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to determine when pressure will amount to unconscionable conduct that 
cannot be covered under any of the other section 40(1) grounds.201  
One definition of ‘harass’ is ‘to trouble or worry persistently with cares, annoyances 
etc.’.202  In the context of section 40(1), harassment entails an invasion of personal 
space for example in the form of spam emails and persistent phone calls.203  
‘Tactic’ is defined as ‘an action or plan that is intended to achieve something’.204  
‘Unfair tactics’ indicates that that action or plan is unacceptable in some way. Unfair 
tactics could possibly include exploiting weak persons other than those covered by 
section 40(2).205 
The forms of conduct discussed above are prohibited when marketing goods and 
services as well and when negotiating, concluding, executing or enforcing an 
agreement to supply goods and services to a consumer.206 
With regard to section 40(2), if the consumer informs the supplier that they are unable 
to read the agreement or do not understand the language contained therein but the 
supplier proceeds to carry out the agreement, that is likely to be unconscionable.207 
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This is because unlike section 40(1), under section 40(2) the supplier must have been 
aware of the weakness.  
The same applies to ‘ignorance’. Ignorance could be a general lack of education on 
the part of the consumer or a lack of specific knowledge pertaining to the consumer’s 
interaction with the supplier.208 
It is suggested that ‘any other similar factor’ could encompass immaturity and 
inexperience which results in the consumer being generally unable to form a proper 
judgment.209 
According to the Cambridge Online Dictionary, to take advantage of someone means 
‘to use someone's weakness to improve your situation’.210 Thus, section 40(2) means 
that the supplier must have exploited the consumer’s weakness for the supplier’s 
benefit.  
In order to ensure that section 40(2) is not contravened, a supplier must make certain 
that the agreement is understood by the relevant consumer and that the consumer is 
capable of protecting their interests.211 
Overall, section 40 emphasises that parties to an agreement ought to act in good faith 
and should abstain from engaging in improper or unconscionable conduct or conduct 
that is contrary to public policy.212 In cases where there has been unconscionable 
conduct, the avenues of recourse available in section 69 are applicable.213 
Both unconscionable conduct (section 40) and false, misleading or deceptive 
representations (section 41) are deemed prohibited conduct under the CPA.214 Thus, 
if it is concluded by the NCC that an arrangement, agreement, practice or scheme 
does not amount to a pyramid scheme, a consumer who suffered as a result thereof 
                                                          
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 The definition can be found on the Cambridge Online Dictionary website available at 
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/take-advantage-of-someone (accessed on 14 
November 2018).  
211 Stoop ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and Procedural Fairness in Consumer Contracts’ 
(2015) 18(4) PER/PELJ 1113.  
212 Ibid 1112 footnote 77.  
213 These include approaching the NCT, an ombud with jurisdiction, an accredited industry ombud, a 
consumer court with jurisdiction, an alternative dispute resolution agent, the NCC or, as a last resort, a 
court with jurisdiction. 
214 Section 51 of the CPA.  
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is not necessarily without recourse. If the perpetrators of a scheme or other 
arrangement acted in a manner that was unconscionable when marketing or 
negotiating an agreement with a consumer, or made false or misleading 
misrepresentations, the consumer may approach a civil court that has the power to 
ensure fair and just conduct, terms and conditions.215 If the court determines that a 
transaction or part of a transaction was unfair or unconscionable, it can make a number 
of orders including ordering that money be restored to the consumer and that the 
consumer be compensated for any losses.216 The consumer can approach a court as 
courts are authorised to deal with contraventions of sections 40, 41 and 48.217  
 
3.4 Enforcement of the Act 
3.4.1 The National Consumer Commission   
The NCC is an organ of state which has been established in terms of Chapter 5, Part 
B of the CPA.218 The jurisdiction of the NCC extends throughout the Republic.219 The 
Commission serves as the primary enforcement body for the CPA220 and receives and 
investigates complaints concerning allegedly prohibited conduct or offences.221 It also 
monitors the consumer market with a view to preventing prohibited practices from 
occurring and to prosecute offenders should such practices be detected.222 In addition, 
the Commission deals with the issue and enforcement of compliance notices.223 The 
CPA permits the NCC to issue a compliance notice to anyone who has contravened 
the CPA by engaging in conduct which the Act deems prohibited.224 Should the person 
on whom the notice is served fail to abide by it, the NCC has the option of either 
referring the matter for prosecution by the NPA or applying to the National Consumer 
Tribunal (NCT) seeking the imposition of an administrative fine.225  
                                                          
215 Section 52 of the CPA. 
216 Section 52 (3) of the CPA. 
217 Section 52 of the CPA.  
218 Havenga … et al General Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2010) 508. 
219 Section 85(1)(a) of the CPA.  
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3.4.2 The National Consumer Tribunal  
Chapter 2, Part B of the National Credit Act (the NCA)226 establishes the NCT. Like 
the NCC, the Tribunal has jurisdiction throughout the Republic.227 It has functions 
similar to a court and has similar status to that of a High Court.228 The NCT conducts 
hearings regarding complaints pertaining to both the NCA and the CPA and 
adjudicates on such matters.229 Section 73(2)(b) of the NCA empowers the NCT to 
deal with referrals from the NCC alleging prohibited conduct.  
Some of the orders the NCT can make where prohibited conduct is concerned include; 
declaring that the conduct is prohibited, issuing an interdict and imposing 
administrative fines.230 However like CAFCOM, the NCT cannot order damages.231 
In terms of section 151(2) of the NCA and section 112(2) of the CPA, an administrative 
fine ‘may not exceed the greater of (a) 10 per cent of the respondent’s annual turnover 
during the preceding financial year; or (b) R1 000 000’. Failure to comply with an NCT 
order may result in a fine, imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.232 
If the matter was heard by only one member of the NCT, the decision may be appealed 
before a full panel.233 If the matter was heard by the full panel, the participant in the 
hearing can, upon application to the High Court, have the decision reviewed or appeal 
against it.234 
 
3.5 The CPA and the Common Law  
The CPA does not alter the common law in its entirety,235 nor does it take away any 
rights consumers have under the common law.236 The common law recognises fraud 
as both a crime and a delict.237 If a contract was fraudulently induced, the innocent 
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230 Section 150 of the NCA.  
231 Woker ‘Why the need for consumer protection legislation? A look at some of the reasons behind the 
promulgation of the National Credit Act and the Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 31(2) Obiter 221. 
232 Section 160 read with section 161 of the NCA.  
233 Section 148(1) of the NCA.  
234 Section 142(a) and (b) of the NCA.  
235 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 22.  
236 Section 2(10) of the CPA.  
237 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 55. 
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party is entitled to institute legal proceedings against the wrongdoer in order to have 
the contract set aside. In addition, the innocent party can claim damages.238 With the 
enactment of the CPA, certain practices are specified as being prohibited, with the 
result being that an administrative fine is imposed on anyone found to be engaging in 
such practices.239  
A contravention of section 43 could also result in the guilty party being charged with 
fraud.240 Fraud may be defined as ‘unlawfully making, with intent to defraud, a 
misrepresentation which causes actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to 
another’.241 It is argued that the perpetrators of a pyramid scheme, by promoting and 
participating in the scheme, unlawfully and intentionally make misrepresentations to 
potential recruits.242 These misrepresentations relate to the fact that the scheme is a 
‘no-fail investment opportunity’.243 These misrepresentations have the effect of 
prejudicing or potentially prejudicing others because if they fall in the lower levels of 
the pyramid, they stand to lose their initial investment and it is unlikely that they will 
generate any profit as promised at the outset.244 According to section 2(10) of the CPA, 
‘no provision of this Act must be interpreted so as to preclude a consumer from 
exercising any rights afforded in terms of the common law’. Thus, perpetrators of 
pyramid schemes may be charged with fraud.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
South Africa is attune to the problem of pyramid schemes in the country. The DTI took 
action in 1980 and imposed conditions regulating pyramid schemes, however, these 
conditions proved cumbersome rather than effective. They were replaced by the 
Business Practices Act of 1988 and its subsequent amendment, the Consumer Affairs 
                                                          
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid 55. 
240 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
phenomena and what the law is doing to protect consumers’ 15 July 2015 available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c62b13a4-d053-48d5-bef2-3b1ac7a85351 (accessed 
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242 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
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(Unfair Business Practices) Act. Under this Act, the BPC (renamed CAFCOM) was 
empowered to conduct either general or specific investigations into harmful (thereafter 
unfair) business practices. These investigations yielded three common practices, one 
of which was promotional pyramid schemes. If the Minister of Trade and Industry 
agreed that the scheme which was the subject of the investigation was unfair, he could 
declare the scheme prohibited and order that the practice be discontinued. The 
problem with this, however, was that a breach in the Minister's order could only be 
dealt with by the SAPS or NPA, bodies which were already inundated with criminal 
matters.  
The Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act was the immediate predecessor 
of the CPA. Despite the Act being replaced by the CPA, the CAFCOM investigations 
influenced section 43 of the CPA. Section 43 expressly prohibits pyramid and other 
related schemes. In addition, section 43(6) allows the Minister to declare schemes 
which have an effect similar to a pyramid scheme as prohibited. Both the promotion of 
and participation in these schemes is deemed unlawful. Moreover, the CPA also 
prohibits false, misleading and deceptive representations as well as unconscionable 
conduct thus providing the consumer with alternative avenues should they discover 
that they have become involved in a scheme which contravenes the CPA, whether it 
be a pyramid scheme, or they have been misled about the true nature of the business 
opportunity they have invested in.  
The NCC is tasked with investigating complaints and may issue a compliance notice 
where prohibited conduct is concerned. Thus, for example, the NCC may issue a 
notice informing the business that it must cease promoting its scheme, refund 
consumers their investments or stop using certain advertising or marketing strategies 
as these are, for example, misleading. Failure to comply with a compliance notice may 
result in either prosecution by the NPA or further investigation by the NCT.  
The NCT is empowered to impose administrative penalties of up to R1 million or 10% 
of a business’s annual turnover. Therefore, even if a business does not go as far as 
becoming a pyramid scheme, there may be other aspects of the business, such as the 
manner in which it is being promoted, which contravenes the CPA.   
Aggrieved consumers can also approach the normal civil courts and ask for a remedy 
in terms of section 52 (3) of the CPA which may mean they are able to claim a refund 
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of their investment and any other costs which they have incurred.  Perpetrators of 
pyramid schemes may also be charged with the criminal offence of fraud under the 
common law. 
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Chapter 4 
Herbalife and the American experience 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned previously, Herbalife is an international direct selling company involved 
in the production, promotion and sales of nutritional products.245 These include sport 
supplements and products which assist with weight management. The name Herbalife 
has become synonymous with the term pyramid scheme with many allegations being 
directed at the company and, in particular, its compensation structure. To determine 
whether these allegations have any merit, Herbalife’s business model will be 
considered, as will the facts, findings and outcome of the FTC investigation undertaken 
in the United States of America. This will be followed by an overview of the current 
legal debates surrounding Herbalife in the United States.  
 
4.2 Criticisms of Herbalife 
Many have criticised Herbalife claiming that its business operations are closer to a 
pyramid scheme rather than an MLM company. In the United States, one such 
accusation was made by television show host, John Oliver, who, on his show Last 
Week Tonight, publicly exposed Herbalife claiming that its so-called business 
opportunity was in fact a scam.246  Another notable allegation was made in December 
2012 by Bill Ackman, a hedge fund manager who founded Pershing Square Capital 
Management.247 Ackman’s claim that Herbalife was a pyramid scheme triggered the 
FTC investigation.248 Among the reasons advanced by Ackman in support of his 
                                                          
245 Herbalife International of America, Inc and Herbalife International, Inc. are subsidiaries of Herbalife 
Nutrition Ltd (formally Herbalife Ltd). They will collectively be referred to as Herbalife or the company. 
Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 Complaint 
for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 3.  
246 Multilevel Marketing: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO) available at  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s6MwGeOm8iI accessed on 21 February 2018.  
247 Ahuja and Kelly ‘Herbalife Disputes Ackman's Claim of 'Pyramid Scheme' 19 December 2012 
available at https://www.cnbc.com/id/100328657 (accessed on 17 October 2018).  
248 Oydele ‘Herbalife is surging after a report that the company has settled its FTC investigation’ 24 
May 2016 available at https://www.businessinsider.com/report-herbalife-ftc-agreement-2016-5?IR=T 
(accessed on 8 November 2018).  
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accusation was that Herbalife misrepresented to new members the income they could 
make by pursuing the Herbalife opportunity.249 In addition, the company did not 
disclose that it was highly unlikely that members would make a substantial income and 
that the majority of rewards advertised by the company were earned by Herbalife’s top 
1% of distributors.250 Ackman also asserted that the company incentivised recruitment 
and made use of recruiting materials that were materially deceptive.251 He also 
accused the company’s nutrition clubs, which serve as a means of recruiting more 
members, of having the characteristics of pyramid schemes.252  One of Ackman’s key 
criticisms related to Herbalife’s compensation structure. He claimed that the 
distributors were compensated in a manner more akin to pyramid schemes than MLM 
programmes.253  
 
4.3 Herbalife’s response 
In a press release dated 20th December 2012, Herbalife responded to Ackman’s 
allegations and expressly stated that, ‘Herbalife is not an illegal pyramid scheme’.254 
The company asserted that its business practices and products were constantly 
reviewed and external experts ensured that Herbalife operated in accordance with the 
law.255 Herbalife also disclosed the findings from an economic analysis of its business 
practices. According to the findings in this analysis, Herbalife conducted its business 
like an MLM model and not in a pyramidal-like manner.256 The analysis also revealed 
                                                          
249 Conversano ‘The War Against Herbalife: Pyramid Scheme or Multi-Level Marketing Master?’ 2015 
available at 
http://www.fraudconference.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Course_Materials/26th/ppt/9A-
James-Conversano.pdf (accessed on 9 October 2018).  
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid.  
252 Majola and Dini ‘All that glitters: an exploration of the Pyramid Scheme and Ponzi Scheme 
phenomena and what the law is doing to protect consumers’ 15 July 2015 available at 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c62b13a4-d053-48d5-bef2-3b1ac7a85351 (accessed 
on 21 February 2018). 
253 Conversano ‘The War Against Herbalife: Pyramid Scheme or Multi-Level Marketing Master?’ 2015 
available at 
http://www.fraudconference.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Course_Materials/26th/ppt/9A-
James-Conversano.pdf (accessed on 9 October 2018).  
254 ‘Herbalife Statement in Response to Ackman Presentation’ 20 December 2012 available at 
https://ir.herbalife.com/news-releases/news-release-details/herbalife-statement-response-ackman-
presentation (accessed on 9 October 2018).  
255 Ibid.   
256 ‘Prominent Expert Economist and Former FTC Advisor Provides Analysis of the Herbalife Business 
Model’ 22 July 2014 available at https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/prominent-expert-
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that Herbalife provides members with a ‘reasonable prospect of operating a financially 
successful business’.257 Michael Johnson, who was the CEO of Herbalife at the time, 
denied Ackman’s allegations and was reported to have said that the company does 
not pay for recruiting.258 
 
4.4 Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing Plan 
In order to assess whether the criticisms levelled against Herbalife (i.e. that it operates 
as a pyramid scheme) have any merit, it is necessary to understand its Sales and 
Marketing Plan. Herbalife operates a multi-level Sales and Marketing Plan with the 
lowest level occupied by distributors or members and the highest level being 
President’s Team.259  There are different benefits associated with every level that help 
determine how members are compensated.260  
There are two main ways in which members can generate an income. Firstly, members 
can derive profits from their resale of Herbalife products, after having subtracted their 
expenses.261 This is known as profit on own sales.262 Secondly, members may choose 
                                                          
economist-and-former-ftc-advisor-provides-analysis-of-the-herbalife-business-model-2014-07-22 
(accessed on 9 October 2018).  
257 Ibid.   
258 Ahuja and Kelly ‘Herbalife Disputes Ackman's Claim of 'Pyramid Scheme' 19 December 2012 
available at https://www.cnbc.com/id/100328657 (accessed on 17 October 2018). 
259 As of 2013, distributors became known as members. However, this did not result in any substantive 
change to Herbalife’s business opportunity. The words distributor and member will thus be used 
interchangeably. Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-
05217 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 4.  
260 Herbalife ‘Discover the Herbalife Opportunity Sales & Marketing Plan’ 2 June 2015 available at 
https://edge.myherbalife.com/vmba/media/2FFABAFF-B277-4B32-80E4-
C6014920D7BD/Web/General/Original/Sales%20%20Marketing%20Plan%20Section_Update%20No
v%202015.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2018).  
261 Expenses include but are not limited to ‘advertising or promotional expenses, product samples, 
training, rent, travel, telephone and Internet costs, and miscellaneous expenses’. Herbalife ‘Sales and 
Marketing Plan’ May 2014 page 20 available at 
http://assets.factsaboutherbalife.com/content/uploads/2015/10/26133816/SalesAndMarketingPlan.pdf 
(accessed on 9 July 2018).  
262 Ibid. 
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to sponsor others,263 thereby enabling those that they sponsor to become members.264 
In this way the sponsors form individual downline sales organisations. Members are 
not financially compensated simply for introducing or sponsoring new members, 
instead, they are compensated for products sold to their downline either for personal 
consumption or for resale. This is termed multilevel compensation.265 
Every Herbalife product is allocated a Volume Point value.266 Members earn credit for 
products ordered (volume) and this is calculated using the Volume Points of the 
products concerned. The points accumulated are used to calculate the qualifications 
and benefits a member is eligible to receive.267  
When members purchase products, they receive a discount, known as a wholesale 
discount,268 which ranges from 25% to 50% off earn base.269 These products are then 
sold to customers. The difference between the selling price (what the customer pays) 
and the cost price (what the member paid) is known as the member’s retail profit.270 
Members can also earn commission (also known as wholesale profit) on products 
purchased by their downline.271 The difference in the cost which members pay and the 
discounted amount which is paid by their downline equates to wholesale profit.272 
                                                          
263 A sponsor is ‘a member who brings another individual into Herbalife’. Herbalife ‘Discover the 
Herbalife Opportunity Sales & Marketing Plan’ 2 June 2015 page 25 available at 
https://edge.myherbalife.com/vmba/media/2FFABAFF-B277-4B32-80E4-
C6014920D7BD/Web/General/Original/Sales%20%20Marketing%20Plan%20Section_Update%20No
v%202015.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2018).  
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and earnings are calculated’. Ibid 24.  
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If a member’s total volume increases, they may become a senior consultant. 273 As a 
senior consultant they are entitled to a discount of 35% to 42% off earn base when 
purchasing products and stand to make a greater profit.274  
In addition to retail and wholesale profit, those who reach the level of Herbalife 
supervisor can also earn royalty overrides of 1% to 5%.275 Royalty overrides are 
calculated on a supervisor’s monthly total volume. However, if a supervisor earns less 
than 500 volume points, they do not qualify for royalty overrides. If a supervisor earns 
2500 volume points or more, they receive the maximum 5% on three of their active 
downline levels. In addition to meeting the aforementioned requirements, supervisors 
must adhere to the 10 Retail Customers Rule276 and the 70% Rule277 in order to qualify 
for royalty overrides. 
A supervisor may also be eligible for royalty override roll-ups.278 This occurs when a 
supervisor who earns a 5% royalty override has downline royalty contributing 
supervisors who do not earn the maximum 5% royalty override. The override roll-up 
earned by the supervisor is equivalent to 5% minus the percentage override actually 
earned by the contributing supervisor.279  
If a supervisor goes on to achieve Top Achievers Business (TAB) Team status, they 
qualify for a production bonus which is based on the volume of their entire 
organisation, with the minimum bonus being 2% and the maximum 7%.280 This is paid 
to the TAB team on a monthly basis. To qualify for a production bonus, the team must 
also abide by the 10 Retail Customers Rule and the 70% Rule.281 A TAB team can 
                                                          
273 Total Volume is equivalent to Personal Volume plus Group Volume. Personal Volume is ‘the volume 
from orders purchased by you as a Fully Qualified Supervisor and all others in your downline 
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277 According to this rule ‘in any given month, a Member must sell to retail customers, and/or sell at 
wholesale to downline Members, at least 70% of the total value of Herbalife products they hold for 
resale, in order to qualify for TAB Team and to earn and receive Royalty Overrides and Production 
Bonus for that month’s business’. Ibid. 
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also earn a production bonus on another TAB team in their downline if that team has 
a lower production bonus percentage. This production bonus will be the difference 
between the TAB team’s production bonus percentage and the downline TAB team’s 
production bonus percentage.282 The production bonus is regarded as a reward for a 
TAB team’s leadership and loyalty.283 
Some of Herbalife President’s Team members may receive an additional bonus known 
as the Mark Hughes Bonus. This is an annual bonus awarded to members who 
displayed superior leadership and motivation during the preceding year,284 and is also 
an acknowledgement of their role in the sale of Herbalife products.285 This bonus can 
be a maximum of 1% of the company’s worldwide sales.286 
Herbalife members may also receive recognition awards such as pins, plaques and 
jewellery, upon reaching a certain level or obtaining a certain qualification.287 Members 
may sometimes also qualify for Herbalife vacations and training events.288 
 
 
                                                          
282 If both TAB teams attain the same production bonus percentage, the upline team can earn on the 
downline team but not on that team’s downline. If a downline team earns a higher production bonus 
than an upline team, the upline team cannot earn a production bonus on the downline team or their 
downline. Herbalife ‘Sales and Marketing Plan’ May 2014 page 25 available at 
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an%20MLM%20Business%20HLF%20as%20a%20Legit%20MLM%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf 
(accessed on 18 July 2018).  
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https://herbalifeevents.com/hrbl/hom-digital-flipbook-usen/ (accessed on 17 September 2018).  
286 Coughlan ‘Assessing an MLM Business: Herbalife as a Legitimate MLM’ July 2012 available at 
https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/Assessing%20
an%20MLM%20Business%20HLF%20as%20a%20Legit%20MLM%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf 
(accessed on 18 July 2018).  
287 Herbalife ‘Discover the Herbalife Opportunity Sales & Marketing Plan’ 2 June 2015 page 20 
available at https://edge.myherbalife.com/vmba/media/2FFABAFF-B277-4B32-80E4-
C6014920D7BD/Web/General/Original/Sales%20%20Marketing%20Plan%20Section_Update%20No
v%202015.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2018).  
288 Ibid 19. 
46 
 
4.4.1 Key criticisms of this Sales and Marketing Plan   
Those who criticise this Sales and Marketing Plan have identified the following key 
problem areas:  
• members need to purchase high quantities of products; 
• the products are very costly;289  
• there is an underlying element of deception to the scheme;290  
• revenues are not distinguished from profits;   
• the costs associated with being a distributor are not revealed;291 
• Herbalife has a very complex commission structure;292  
• sponsors do not properly explain how members will progress in the 
compensation hierarchy and there are many difficulties associated with trying 
to progress;293  
• difficulties associated with certain forms of compensation in particular are not 
explained;294 
• the company places a great deal of emphasis on recruitment; and  
• only a small minority seem to benefit financially.295  
To elaborate, critics argue that in order to be eligible for and benefit from Herbalife 
bonuses, distributors and their recruits need to purchase many products.296 These 
products are overpriced and exploit poor consumers who are deceived into purchasing 
products they are incapable of selling or do not wish to consume.297 Despite the cost 
of these products and the fact that there is a good chance they will not be sold or used 
                                                          
289 Partnoy ‘Is Herbalife a Pyramid Scheme?’ June 2014, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/wall-streets-6-billion-mystery/361624/ 
(accessed on 18th April 2018). 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
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by the members, members buy products because the purchase is coupled with a 
perceived business opportunity.298 Consumers labour under the false impression that 
by simply participating in the scheme they will be able to derive a substantial 
income.299  
This impression is created in part by Herbalife’s complex commission structure.300 The 
perception is that because there are multiple ways to earn income with Herbalife, it is 
easy to do so. Critics disagree with this perception claiming that it is difficult to earn 
money from these various streams and to do so requires massive downlines.301 
Moreover, sponsors do not inform recruits of this difficulty. Recruits are merely told 
that in order to advance in the compensation hierarchy they need to put in hard work 
and effort.302 Production bonuses in particular pose a problem because they are 
payable on infinite levels.303 In other words, a distributor will receive a production 
bonus on each level of their downline regardless of how many levels there are. This is 
problematic because it is a further indication that Herbalife incentivises recruitment.304  
The promotional vacations offered by Herbalife are also criticised. These promotions 
usually have high qualification thresholds and result in upline distributors pressurising 
their downlines to purchase many products, to meet the threshold, even though there 
is no consumer demand for the products.305  Herbalife products may also be difficult 
to sell because similar products can be found at retail stores where they are not as 
expensive.306 Furthermore, Herbalife does not divulge the number of other distributors 
who are selling products in a particular area.  This failure to disclose can result in 
distributors competing for the same consumer market.307 A further problem exists 
when there are higher-level distributors working in the same market as entry-level 
distributors.  Higher-earning distributors qualify for greater discounts on products, so 
                                                          
298 Harris ‘Herbalife a “pyramid scheme”?’ 31 December 2012 available at 
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it is possible for them to sell those products at a lower cost than entry-level distributors.  
This makes it even more difficult for newer distributors to find consumers.  
The Herbalife compensation and commission structure is criticised as a whole for 
operating in a way that only allows those at the top of the compensation plan to prosper 
financially.  These top-level distributors will prosper at the expense of those at the 
bottom of the commission structure.308 It is argued that only a few distributors who join 
Herbalife will make money and their profits are derived from recruiting new members, 
convincing them to purchase products and encouraging them to recruit others. This is 
possibly the main criticism of the Herbalife Sales and Marketing Plan because it 
resonates with the principal feature of a pyramid scheme namely, income is derived 
primarily through the introduction of new recruits as opposed to the sale of goods or 
services to consumers. Upline distributors advance in the company hierarchy, obtain 
greater discounts and they receive commission when distributors below them 
purchase Herbalife products from the company, hence, distributors are incentivised to 
recruit and are essentially paid to recruit.309 
 
4.5 Arguments in favour of Herbalife as a legitimate MLM programme 
The view that Herbalife is a pyramid scheme is not supported by all. Those who 
oppose this view highlight certain characteristics of Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing 
Plan and its business model which, it is argued, demonstrate that it is a legitimate MLM 
programme.  
Coughlan, a professor of marketing, argues that Herbalife distributors are 
compensated based on their role in generating product sales and not for mere 
recruitment. 310 She argues further that the registration fee payable by members upon 
joining the organisation is low. Upon registration, members are required to purchase 
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https://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/coughlan/htm/personalpage_files/Papers/Assessing%20
an%20MLM%20Business%20HLF%20as%20a%20Legit%20MLM%207-30-2012%20FINAL.pdf 
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either a Mini International Business Pack (IBP) or a full IBP.311 The mini IBP includes, 
amongst other things, samples of Herbalife products while the full IBP contains some 
full-sized products. At that time, in the United States, the price of the mini IBP was 
$57.75 and the full IBP was $95.55.312 According to Coughlan this was lower than the 
median cost of starter kits which the United States Direct Selling Association reported 
to be $99. It should be noted, however, that the cost of these packs has since 
escalated. As of November 2017, the IBP cost approximately $94.10 and the IBP 
Super Starter cost $124.10.313 Both figures exclude tax and shipping.314  
Coughlan also asserts that, unlike goods sold by pyramid schemes, Herbalife’s 
products are valuable to consumers. Herbalife is committed to ensuring that they 
produce quality products and it spends a considerable amount of money on scientific 
research and employs highly qualified staff to do this research.315 It is suggested by 
Coughlan that Herbalife’s long-standing history is evidence that its products are 
valuable to consumers. Herbalife, in its Sales and Marketing Plan also provides a 
return policy.316  If customers are not satisfied with the products they have purchased, 
they can, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, appeal to the member from 
whom they purchased the products, for a refund. According to Herbalife, this refund 
policy exists because the company firmly believes in its products and assures the 
quality thereof.317 Coughlan also points out that products are widely sold to consumers 
                                                          
311 As of 2013, the IBP also became known as the Herbalife Member Pack. Federal Trade Commission 
v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 Complaint for Permanent Injunction 
and Other Equitable Relief 15 July 2016 page 29. 
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4db9-bb7e-cde4bca50b06 (accessed on 11 October 2018).   
314 Information regarding the cost of Herbalife member packs is available at 
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external to the organisation and not only to other distributors. However, according to 
Coughlan, this latter point is only relevant in assessing whether a scheme is a pyramid 
scheme if the products in question have little or no value and sales are driven solely 
by recruitment.318 Her main argument, as stated above, is that the Herbalife products 
have value for consumers. 
Herbalife distributors are also discouraged from engaging in inventory loading.319 
Distributors are told that products must be purchased in order to be sold to retail 
customers or distributed through a distributor’s downline or should be consumed 
personally by the distributor and/or their families.  
The company also offers a buyback policy which allows members wanting to resign to 
return, in exchange for a full refund, unopened products which they have purchased 
within the past year and which remain in their possession.320 Herbalife will also pay for 
shipping and, if resignation occurs within a member’s first year at Herbalife, they will 
also be refunded in full for the starter pack purchased.321  Furthermore, within 90 days 
of joining Herbalife, a distributor is entitled to forgo the business opportunity and their 
sponsor is obliged to accept this together with the return of any unsold inventory.322 
 
4.6 The United States of America investigation 
Before considering the actual investigation into Herbalife by the American authorities, 
it is necessary to have a brief understanding of the applicable law in the United 
States.323 
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4.6.1 The FTC and the FTC Act 
The FTC is the American equivalent of the NCC and the NCT.324 It is an independent 
government agency whose responsibility includes, inter alia, to ensure consumer 
protection under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (the FTC Act).325  The 
FTC Act is similar to the CPA in that it outlaws certain conduct. Under section 5 of the 
FTC Act, unfair or deceptive acts and practices are prohibited as well as unfair 
methods of competition. Section 5 also mandates the disclosure of material terms to 
a contract. False, misleading and unsubstantiated material representations 
concerning the income a potential member is likely to earn are an infringement of 
section 5.326 A company must be able to substantiate its claims with objective 
evidence.327 Claims which are true may not necessarily be a reflection of typical results 
for example, get-rich-quick advertisements, lifestyle testimonials and hypothetical 
earnings. If such claims cannot be attained by the majority of members, they may be 
deemed misleading.328  
The FTC Act empowers the FTC to conduct formal investigations into companies, 
obtain injunctive relief to prevent further consumer injury and bring administrative 
enforcement actions with the aim of obtaining financial redress for consumers.329 
Enforcement actions generally result in the conclusion of consent orders,330 which is 
the South African equivalent of settlement agreements.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
324 Information regarding the respective consumer protection agencies worldwide can be found on the 
FTC website available at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/international/competition-consumer-protection-
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4.6.2 The FTC investigation into Herbalife 
Prompted by the allegations that Herbalife was acting improperly, the FTC launched 
an investigation into its business model.331 The FTC’s argument primarily centred 
around Herbalife’s income misrepresentations. The company claimed that those who 
joined the scheme could make a substantial income, either part time or full time.332 
This message was communicated through various mediums of advertising such as 
videos, live presentations, as well as print materials.333 
The FTC argued that a consideration of its compensation plan revealed that rather 
than incentivising retail sales, Herbalife incentivised the recruiting of further members 
who make wholesale purchases of products.334 The FTC pointed out that retail sales 
were not very lucrative and were possibly only sufficient to lessen the costs of 
participating in the programme. It was also established that just a few distributors 
made money from the Herbalife programme and that instead of making money, many 
members actually lost money.335  
Although Herbalife sometimes displayed disclaimers in conjunction with the 
representations it made regarding potential earnings, it was argued that this did not 
detract from the overall impression that the message sent out by Herbalife created, 
namely, that distributors could generate a considerable income.336 It was further 
argued that these disclaimers were usually in fine print and often contained reference 
to another document such as Herbalife’s Statement of Average Gross Compensation. 
In order to fully understand the message, distributors would have to access and read 
further documents. Even if distributors did go to the lengths of reading these 
documents, it was found that these documents did not convey realistic expectations 
either.337 
                                                          
331 Partnoy ‘Is Herbalife a Pyramid Scheme?’ June 2014, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/wall-streets-6-billion-mystery/361624/ 
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332 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 4. 
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Moreover, Herbalife videos, which were accessible on Herbalife websites and included 
in the mandatory starter pack that distributors purchased, contained images of lavish 
cars, houses and holiday destinations.338 These videos also included income 
testimonials. As a whole, the FTC argued, the message that these videos portrayed 
was that becoming a Herbalife distributor was an opportunity for earning a substantial 
income.339 
It was also suggested that at live presentations, Herbalife usually chose, as 
presenters, those who were among the few who had reached the higher ranks in the 
company. These presenters repetitively stated that the Herbalife opportunity was one 
which was accompanied by substantial income, subject only to the effort that was put 
in by distributors.340 The FTC also noted that these presentations usually involved 
distributors buying a minimum number of Herbalife products to attend and/or paying a 
fee to attend.341 
Herbalife also included print publications, such as a document entitled ‘Your Business 
Basics’, which led customers to believe that they could earn additional income on a 
monthly basis, with no bar to their financial potential, and be successful like thousands 
of others who had joined Herbalife.342 Another form of print publication was the 
Presentation Book which, from the period of 2012 to 2014, had been included as part 
of the Herbalife starter pack.343 This book was created with the intention of being 
shown to possible recruits. Contained in the book was the statement that Herbalife 
provided ‘[t]he opportunity to earn more than you ever thought possible and make your 
dreams come true!’. Accompanying this statement were pictures of fancy cars, 
houses, boats and dollar bills.  
Distributor testimonials were also contained in the Presentation Book as well as in 
Herbalife Today, an online Herbalife magazine. In these testimonials, distributors 
spoke about how Herbalife had had a life-changing impact on them and how, ever 
since becoming a member, they had financially prospered.344  
                                                          
338 Ibid 6. 
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Herbalife promotional material, such as videos and print material mentioned above, 
also portrayed to consumers the idea that significant income could be earned through 
retail sales of Herbalife products.345 It was argued by the FTC that such 
representations were misleading. This was because Herbalife did not record ‘either 
the existence or profitability of Distributor attempts to retail Herbalife products’.346 This 
statement can be supported by one made by Des Walsh, former President of 
Herbalife. When asked how many products were sold to non-Herbalife members, 
Walsh replied ‘we don’t track this number and do not believe it is relevant’.347 The 
company did, however, conduct a survey in 2014, the results of which revealed that 
only 39% of product sales were to those outside of the organisation.348 According to 
the FTC, ‘the overwhelming majority of Herbalife Distributors who pursue the business 
opportunity make little or no money from retail sales’.349 
The FTC alleged that Herbalife created the impression that its members could obtain 
a substantial financial benefit from retail sales.350 The FTC claimed that this was 
partially achieved through the promotion of nutrition clubs.351 Herbalife members lease 
premises or make use of their homes to operate nutrition clubs. Customers are 
required to pay a membership fee to join the club, following which they may consume 
certain Herbalife products on site. Customers are not charged individually for the 
products they consume. A key feature of these clubs, as noted by the FTC, is that 
products cannot be purchased on site. According to the FTC, the impression created 
by Herbalife that nutrition clubs generate substantial income for their respective 
owners is incorrect.352 Instead, club owners most often ran a loss because the 
associated costs of running the club were greater than the cumulative membership 
fees collected.353 The FTC claimed that these clubs served instead as a means of 
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recruiting new members.354 If customers became members and then nutrition club 
owners themselves, the club owner who recruited them could become successful if 
the new owner purchases products for their club from the original owner. 
In relation to the purchasing of products, the FTC stated that distributors were 
pressured to buy in bulk in order to benefit from greater wholesale discounts.355 
Furthermore, Herbalife’s buyback policy is subject to the distributor resigning.356 Thus, 
a distributor cannot return their unsold products and retain their status as a distributor.  
Despite Herbalife’s statements that income is retail-based, it was established that 
income was actually dependent on recruitment.357 Sponsors earned money by 
purchases made by their downline. The importance of recruitment was emphasised 
by Herbalife in its printed publications. Material such as the Presentation Book 
illustrated how a distributor could earn money through recruiting others who in turn 
brought in new recruits. This is termed the ‘power of duplication’.358 The role of 
recruitment in Herbalife’s compensation plan was also highlighted by one of the 
members of Herbalife’s Founder’s Circle during a live presentation in 2009. At the 
presentation it was stated that royalty was ‘the name of the game’ and could only be 
earned through helping other distributors become successful and not through 
consumers.359 In a Spanish presentation a Herbalife President’s team member is 
reported to have said that ‘the only way to scale the ladder of success is through 
sponsorship’.360  
The FTC established that recruitment was the only way in which a distributor could 
possibly earn a substantial income.361 Herbalife compensated its distributors based on 
the volume of products purchased by their downline and not actual retail sales. Thus, 
there was an incentive for recruiting new members and to encourage these recruits to 
purchase a high quantity of products.362 
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The FTC criticised Herbalife’s compensation plan commenting that members 
transcended to higher levels in the organisation and were entitled to rewards based 
on product purchases as opposed to product sales and these higher levels could only 
be reached by recruitment.363 A member’s progress was dependent on substantial 
wholesale product purchases made either personally or by their downline. The 
Herbalife compensation plan created an incentive for distributors to recruit others 
because distributors could earn different types of profit from creating a downline.364 In 
essence, the greater the distributor’s downline, the higher they would progress, the 
greater rewards they would reap. There ought to be a reasonable likelihood that 
members could derive a profit from the resale of products. However, the FTC found 
that the majority of Herbalife members made little or no profit from the sale of Herbalife 
products and some even lost money.365  
 
4.6.3 The outcome of the FTC investigation and its impact on Herbalife 
The FTC concluded that Herbalife’s practices were unfair because the company 
incentivised members to purchase products and to enlist others to also purchase 
products. Advancing in the Herbalife business opportunity was dependent on product 
purchases and not actual retail demand.366 The FTC concluded that these actions of 
Herbalife ‘cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that consumers 
cannot reasonably avoid themselves’.367  
In addition, Herbalife was found guilty of income misrepresentation as well as ‘false or 
unsubstantiated claims of income from retail sales’, particularly in its marketing and 
advertising practices.368 These conclusions were reached because the company 
conveyed the impression that, by joining Herbalife, members were likely to earn a 
substantial income, however this was often not the case and was seldom 
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accompanied by supporting evidence. These misrepresentations contravened the 
FTC Act because they were deceptive.369 
The FTC investigation culminated in a settlement agreement with Herbalife.370 Though 
the FTC did not conclude that Herbalife was a pyramid scheme per se, it did require 
the company to make certain changes.371 In the settlement agreement, Herbalife 
consented to restructuring its business so that compensation is determined by actual 
retail sales as opposed to wholesale purchases made by distributors and their 
downlines. According to the agreement, a minimum of 80% of Herbalife sales needs 
to be to legitimate end-users, failing which, rewards must be reduced to lower levels. 
Actual retail sales will be evidenced by receipts and Herbalife will also monitor sales 
and distribution via a mobile application.372 
The order also required that an Independent Compliance Auditor observe, for seven 
years, how Herbalife restructures its compensation plan and ascertain whether 
Herbalife acts in accordance with the structural provisions.373  
In addition, Herbalife was required to pay $2 million as a form of consumer redress. 
Cheques were awarded to approximately 350 000 people with the intention of 
compensating them for financial loss suffered as a result of Herbalife’s misleading 
income representations.374 The company was also precluded from misleading 
consumers further. 
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4.7 Current allegations against Herbalife 
Presently, in the United States, there is a federal lawsuit against Herbalife.375 The 
distributors who instituted legal action claim that Herbalife coerced them into attending 
numerous events entitled ‘Circle of Success’ which were costly but which were not ‘the 
secret to wealth’ as they purported to be. Herbalife seeks to have the matter 
dismissed376 or, alternatively, transferred to a court in California.377 According to 
Herbalife, the distributors did not properly articulate how they were deceived. Herbalife 
also contends that many of the claims in the present case were addressed in the FTC 
settlement agreement.378 The plaintiffs disagree claiming that these events were not 
covered under the FTC investigation.379 The outcome of these newfound allegations 
has yet to unfold. 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
Herbalife’s business model and operations appear to be a contentious issue.380 Whilst 
some are convinced that the company operates a pyramid scheme because of its 
emphasis on recruitment,381 others argue that the Herbalife business opportunity 
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bears semblance to that of a legitimate MLM firm.382 Those who favour the latter view 
cite Herbalife’s buyback policy, discouragement of inventory loading, minimal start-up 
costs and offering of legitimate products with real value, in support of their argument.  
Herbalife denied the complaints and allegations made against it.383 These allegations 
were subsequently addressed by the FTC in its investigation.384 The FTC ultimately 
held that Herbalife was not a pyramid scheme, however, the outcome was not all that 
favourable for Herbalife. The FTC found that the company was guilty of misleading its 
members by misrepresenting to them the income they could potentially earn. In 
addition, recruitment was essential to a Herbalife distributor’s progress in the 
company. This led the FTC to conclude that Herbalife was not a viable retail-based 
opportunity and that Herbalife’s actions and conduct amounted to a contravention of 
section 5 of the FTC Act.385 Consequently, Herbalife entered into a settlement 
agreement with the FTC in terms of which it consented to making changes to its 
compensation structure, to discontinue misleading consumers and to pay $2 million to 
Herbalife members who had been misled and suffered financial loss as a result 
thereof. To ensure compliance with the settlement agreement, the FTC also ordered 
that, for seven years, an Independent Compliance Auditor must monitor how Herbalife 
restructures its compensation plan.386 As of late, there have been further allegations 
against Herbalife with distributors alleging misrepresentation on the part of 
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Herbalife.387 However, insofar as the new allegations are concerned, it remains to be 
seen what transpires.  
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Chapter 5 
Herbalife under South African law 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Herbalife began in South Africa in 1995 where it continues to operate.388 This Chapter 
will analyse Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing Plan in light of the relevant CPA 
provisions as set out in Chapter 3. Thereafter Herbalife will be viewed under the 
common law concept of fraud.  
 
5.2 Herbalife in South Africa 
According to the South African Herbalife Statement of Average Gross Compensation 
for 2017,389 South African Herbalife distributors can generate an income in two ways 
namely; they can profit from their own sales and multilevel compensation.390 Apart 
from this, the South African website does not provide detailed information regarding 
how members are compensated. However, the Statement of Average Gross 
Compensation incorporates, by reference, the United States Herbalife Sales and 
Marketing Plan. For this reason, the compensation and commission structure as 
detailed in Chapter 4 will be examined in the light of South African law. 
 
5.3 Herbalife and section 43 of the CPA 
According to the definition of pyramid scheme provided by section 43(4), a business 
plan will constitute a pyramid scheme when participants earn money primarily from 
recruitment rather than actual retail sales or, alternatively, during the promotion of the 
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scheme, recruitment is emphasised as being essential to compensation. As 
acknowledged by the FTC, Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing Plan incentivised 
recruitment because it rewarded upline distributors for wholesale product purchases 
made by their downline.391 Progress in the compensation hierarchy depended on 
recruitment and not retail sales.392 Herbalife continues to reward its members for 
wholesale purchases made by their downline. In 2017, 1 045 non-sales leaders in 
South Africa earned wholesale profit for downline purchases from Herbalife itself 
together with 5 016 sales leaders with a downline.393 However, following the FTC 
investigation, there has been an increase in product sales to legitimate end users.  
In February 2017, Herbalife stated that approximately 60% of its sales were to 
legitimate end users and during April 2017,394 this figure increased to more than 
70%.395 The company has since reached the threshold requirement of 80% of sales 
to legitimate end users as set out in its consent agreement concluded with the FTC.396 
Despite this, if Herbalife members earn more money via recruitment than via these 
external sales, Herbalife will fit the South African definition of a pyramid scheme.  
The definition of a pyramid scheme set out in section 43(4) contains two parts. Thus, 
even if recruitment is not the primary means through which Herbalife distributors earn 
money, Herbalife may still amount to a pyramid scheme if it is promoted in a manner 
that emphasises that recruitment is essential to compensation. This is because of 
section 43(4)(b) which makes it unlawful for an arrangement, agreement, practice or 
scheme to be promoted in this way.  
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As noted by the FTC, Herbalife live presentations, as well as promotional material that 
existed in print and video form, stressed the importance of recruitment, discussed the 
‘power of duplication’, and in one instance went as far as saying that, ‘the only way to 
scale the ladder of success is through sponsorship’.397 This form of advertising will fall 
under the latter part of the section 43(4) definition of a pyramid scheme. Engaging in 
the promotion of such scheme, as well as participating therein, amounts to prohibited 
conduct under section 43(2)(b) of the CPA. The Herbalife South Africa website does, 
however, contain a disclaimer warning against the scheme being promoted in a 
manner that emphasises recruitment and it also acknowledges the illegality thereof.398 
Furthermore, in the event that Herbalife is not a pyramid scheme by definition, it may 
still be classified as a prohibited scheme. The Minister of Trade and Industry may, by 
virtue of sections 43(2)(d) and 43(6), declare Herbalife as being a prohibited scheme 
if he is of the opinion that its nature or effect is similar to that of a pyramid scheme. 
However, even if Herbalife restructures its compensation plan so that it does not 
resemble a pyramid scheme, or such that its nature and effect is not similar to that of 
a pyramid scheme, it may still fall foul of other sections of the CPA.  
 
5.4 Herbalife and section 40 of the CPA 
An interpretation of section 40 of the CPA leads to the conclusion that neither Herbalife 
nor any of its distributors must knowingly or unknowingly act unethically or improperly 
when dealing with a consumer. It is prohibited conduct for them to engage in any 
conduct listed in section 40. Of particular relevance is coercion, duress and pressure.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the criticisms of Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing 
Plan is the promotional vacations which the company offers. To qualify for these 
vacations, downline distributors are pressurised to buy many products.399 Section 
                                                          
397 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 25.  
398 The disclaimer reads as follows, ‘[w]hen considering or comparing business opportunities please be 
aware that it is illegal for a promoter or participant in a trading scheme to persuade anyone to make a 
payment by promising benefits from getting others to join a scheme. Do not be misled by claims that 
high earnings are easily achieved’ and can be found on the South African website available at 
http://businessopportunity.herbalife.co.za/ (accessed on 21 November 2018). 
399 Criticisms about Herbalife’s compensation plan can be found on the Facts About Herbalife website 
available at https://www.factsaboutherbalife.com/the-facts/the-herbalife-compensation-plan/ (accessed 
on 8 November 2018). 
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40(1) of the CPA includes pressure as a form of unconscionable conduct. However, 
as mentioned in Chapter 3, it is difficult to determine when pressure will amount to 
unconscionable conduct that cannot be covered under any of the other section 40(1) 
grounds.400 It can thus be argued that this kind of pressure placed upon Herbalife 
distributors fits the definition of coercion. The same can be said in the following 
situation. The FTC was alert to the fact that Herbalife forced distributors to buy 
products in bulk so that they could benefit from greater wholesale discounts.401 
Although the FTC found that this amounted to pressure, it is possible that, under 
section 40 of the CPA, such conduct would constitute coercion.  
Moreover, the current pending litigation against Herbalife in the United States is 
centred around the allegation that Herbalife coerced members into attending 
numerous ‘Circle of Success’ events.402 If these allegations have any merit, this will 
also amount to unconscionable conduct, in the form of coercion, under the CPA. 
Owing to the similarity between the definition of coercion and duress, Herbalife’s 
conduct in the different situations discussed above could possibly also fall under 
duress. 
Section 40(2) of the CPA is similar to section 5 of the FTC Act.403 Section 40(2) 
precludes Herbalife distributors from consciously taking advantage of a consumer who 
is substantially incapable of protecting their own interests. One reason for this may be 
a consumer’s ignorance. If the consumer is uneducated in general or uneducated 
about the Herbalife business opportunity, and the distributor, who despite being aware 
of this fact uses it to their own benefit, this could amount to unconscionable conduct. 
Although sections 40(1) and 40(2) provide a list of conduct that is considered 
unconscionable, this list is not exhaustive, hence, Herbalife and its representatives 
need to abstain from all forms of unethical and improper conduct. 
                                                          
400 Du Plessis ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct: Section 40 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 75 THRHR 29. 
401 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 22. 
402 Fin 24 ‘Herbalife distributors claim in $1 billion lawsuit that 'success' events were a sham’ 21 August 
2018 available at https://www.fin24.com/Economy/herbalife-distributors-claim-in-1-billion-lawsuit-that-
success-events-were-a-sham-20180821 (accessed on 11 October 2018). 
403 According to section 5 of the FTC Act, ‘an act or practice is unfair where it (1) causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers, (2) cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers and (3) is not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition’. 
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5.5 Herbalife and sections 29, 41 and 48 of the CPA 
Like section 40, section 41 of the CPA bears similarity to section 5 of the FTC Act. In 
order to ensure compliance with sections 29 and 41 of the CPA, neither Herbalife nor 
its distributors must convey false, misleading or deceptive representations to 
consumers whilst marketing Herbalife products. Furthermore, section 41(1)(c) read 
with section 41(2)(b) mandates that they correct any misapprehension which 
consumers have which can be construed as being a false, misleading or deceptive 
representation.  
A major flaw in Herbalife’s Sales and Marketing Plan, as pointed out by the FTC, was 
the representations it gave distributors regarding their financial prospects of success. 
The various forms of marketing and promotional material used by the company led 
distributors to believe that they could earn a significant income either part-time or full 
time.404 This differed from reality where only a few distributors benefitted substantially 
whilst most generated only a small income (if at all) or experienced a loss.405 
Herbalife’s 2017 Statement of Average Gross Compensation contains a disclaimer 
regarding potential earnings.406 However, as noted by the FTC in its investigation, 
these disclaimers do not change the general message portrayed by Herbalife, that is, 
that its members can earn a substantial income.407  
Herbalife also created the impression that distributors earn a significant income from 
the sale of Herbalife products.408 This can be regarded as a false representation 
because, as discussed previously, the main source of a distributor’s income stems 
from recruitment.409 However, in light of the fact that Herbalife has since placed a 
                                                          
404 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 4-5. 
405 Ibid 38. 
406 The disclaimer reads as follows, ‘[t]he compensation summarized below is not necessarily 
representative of the compensation, if any, that any particular Member will receive. These figures should 
not be considered as guarantees or projections of your actual compensation or profits. Success with 
Herbalife Nutrition results only from successful product sales efforts, which require hard work, diligence 
and leadership. Your success will depend upon how effectively you exercise these qualities’. 
407 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 5. 
408 Ibid 14.  
409 Ibid 26.  
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greater focus on retail sales by complying with the 80% threshold set by the FTC, it 
can be argued that this representation is no longer inaccurate.410  
Another way in which Herbalife members are deceived or misled is through the 
promotion of nutrition clubs. Members are given the idea that nutrition clubs earn a 
substantial sum of money for the club owner, however, the FTC investigation revealed 
otherwise.411  
Owing to the discrepancy between what Herbalife asserted and what actually 
transpired, the abovementioned claims could be viewed as false, deceptive or 
misleading representations under section 41 of the CPA. In terms of section 48 of the 
CPA, if there is a false, misleading or deceptive representation by Herbalife or its 
distributors which a consumer acts upon to their detriment, the resulting contract will 
be unfair, unreasonable or unjust. A contract between Herbalife and a consumer will 
also be unfair, unreasonable or unjust if Herbalife or its distributors make a statement 
of opinion and the consumer’s reliance thereon negatively impacts upon them.412 If the 
contract is as a result of unconscionable conduct or false, misleading or deceptive 
representations, the consumer can approach a civil court.413 If the court finds that the 
consumer’s allegations are correct, it will decide on an appropriate remedy such as 
ordering Herbalife to restore the consumer’s money as well as recompense the 
consumer for any loss suffered.414  
 
5.6 The consequences Herbalife can face if it engages in prohibited conduct 
It is the responsibility of the NCC to investigate any complaint it receives which alleges 
that Herbalife is engaging in prohibited conduct stipulated in sections 43, 40 or 41. 
Should the NCC find these allegations to be correct, it may issue a compliance notice 
to Herbalife.415 The notice will stipulate how Herbalife has breached the CPA and how 
                                                          
410 Milkweed ‘Herbalife Compliance Issues’ 20 November 2018 available at 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4223696-herbalife-compliance-issues?page=3 (accessed on 21 
November 2018). 
411 Federal Trade Commission v Herbalife International of America Inc Case No. 2:16-cv-05217 
Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, 15 July 2016 page 20. 
412 Section 48(2)(c).  
413 Section 52.  
414 Section 52(3).  
415 Section 100(1).  
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Herbalife can rectify this, usually within a specified time.416 Alternatively, within the 
specified time, Herbalife can bring forth reasonable evidence indicating that it did not 
engage in conduct prohibited under the CPA.417 
Should Herbalife fail to act in accordance with the notice, the matter can be referred 
to either the NPA for prosecution or the NCT. The NCT has the power to impose an 
administrative fine.418 The orders which the NCT can make if Herbalife is found guilty 
of engaging in a prohibited practice under the CPA are those set out in section 150 of 
the National Credit Act.419 This includes declaring Herbalife’s conduct as prohibited, 
issuing an interdict against Herbalife and imposing an administrative fine on Herbalife. 
The fine can be equivalent to 10% of Herbalife’s annual turnover in the previous year 
or R1 000 000, whichever amount is higher.420 Herbalife’s failure to comply with an 
NCT order may result in a fine or imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.421 
 
5.7 Herbalife and the common law 
In addition to section 41 of the CPA, the common law also precludes Herbalife from 
making misrepresentations. If Herbalife makes a false representation, the purpose of 
which is to defraud consumers, and which prejudices or which can prejudice 
consumers, then Herbalife’s conduct will be tantamount to the common law definition 
of fraud. Herbalife’s inaccurate statements regarding the potential earnings its 
members could expect to receive can be regarded as being prejudicial or potentially 
prejudicial because it was contrary to reality where the business opportunity was 
profitable to only a few while most derived no profits or incurred a loss. If Herbalife 
members joined the company because they were misled by these fraudulent 
                                                          
416 Moodley-Isaacs ‘How the consumer law will be enforced’ 24 January 2011 available at 
https://www.iol.co.za/personal-finance/how-the-consumer-law-will-be-enforced-1016167 (accessed on 
29 November 2018). 
417 Ibid. 
418 Havenga … et al General Principles of Commercial Law 7 ed (2010) 508. 
419 Act 34 of 2005.  The NCT was established by the National Credit Act (NCA) and its powers and 
functions were extended when the CPA came into operation in 2011.  Therefore, in order to ascertain 
the powers and functions of the NCT it is necessary to consider the relevant sections of the NCA as 
these are not re-iterated in the CPA. 
420 Section 151(2) of the NCA and section 112(2) of the CPA. 
421 Section 160 read with section 161 of the NCA.  
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representations, they are entitled, under the common law, to take legal action against 
Herbalife and to claim damages.422 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
It is apparent that the manner in which Herbalife operates in South Africa mimics its 
operation in the United States. Under South African law, Herbalife is prohibited from 
operating a pyramid scheme. An analysis of Herbalife's Sales and Marketing Plan 
through the lens of the CPA leads to the conclusion that Herbalife's focus on 
incentivising recruitment, as opposed to retail sales, prior to the FTC investigation, 
would render it a pyramid scheme under the section 43(4)(a) definition. However, 
Herbalife has since increased its retail sales to external consumers to over 80%. 
Nevertheless, by promoting the Herbalife opportunity in a manner that emphasises 
recruitment and by determining a member's progress and compensation based on 
recruitment, Herbalife can still amount to a pyramid scheme under section 43(4)(b). 
However even if the NCC, following an investigation into Herbalife, finds otherwise, 
Herbalife is unlikely to escape liability. This is because the NCC is entitled to 
investigate all forms of prohibited conduct and not just the promotion of, and 
participation in, pyramid schemes.  
Herbalife's conduct and representations made while promoting the scheme and 
attempting to enlist new members may constitute unconscionable conduct under 
section 40 of the CPA and/or false, misleading or deceptive representations under 
section 41. As with all forms of prohibited conduct investigated by the NCC, Herbalife 
may be issued a compliance notice. Failure to adhere thereto may have further 
consequences as the matter may then be prosecuted by the NPA. Alternatively, the 
NCT may impose an administrative fine on Herbalife.  
 
 
 
                                                          
422 Melville The Consumer Protection Act made easy 2 ed (2011) 55. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
This research was undertaken with the intention of determining whether Herbalife is a 
legitimate MLM company or an illegal pyramid scheme under South African law, which 
has specific legislation dealing with pyramid schemes. The reason for embarking on 
this research stems from the numerous allegations against Herbalife in other 
jurisdictions, most notably the United States, where the FTC declared Herbalife to be 
a legitimate business model but ordered that certain changes be made and that 
consumers who had been misled be compensated. 
This research has demonstrated that there is a very fine line between legitimate MLM 
companies and illegal pyramid schemes, especially when a legitimate product is 
involved, and it is in this case not easy to make a definitive finding one way or the 
other.  This is also demonstrated by the NCC’s inability to make findings on so many 
of the schemes that it has commenced investigating.423 It is evident from this research 
that Herbalife does sell legitimate products which are beneficial to consumers, 
particularly athletes and those seeking to maintain a healthy lifestyle. The cost of 
Herbalife Member Packs is also, arguably, reasonable and proportionate to what 
members receive in return, namely, the packs themselves and the opportunity to 
pursue the business opportunity. Furthermore, Herbalife adopts a buyback policy. 
These features of Herbalife’s business model indicate that Herbalife really does 
resemble an MLM. However, there are other aspects of the business model which are 
questionable, particularly the issues around the compensation plan and the amount of 
money that can be made from participating in the scheme.  
To amount to a pyramid scheme under the CPA, an arrangement, agreement, practice 
or scheme must compensate its participants primarily for recruitment, or, while 
promoting, it must emphasise that recruitment is the primary form of compensation. 
                                                          
423 Information regarding the NCC’s decision to decline reporting on certain schemes which it had 
investigated can be found on the Behind MLM website available at 
https://behindmlm.com/companies/world-ventures/nccs-worldventures-findings-will-not-be-made-
public/ (accessed on 10 January 2019).  
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Majority of Herbalife’s product sales (about 80%) is to consumers who are not 
Herbalife recruits.424 Furthermore, the South African Herbalife website expressly 
warns against the promotion of Herbalife in a way that emphasises recruitment.425 It 
can thus be concluded that Herbalife does not conform to the section 43 definition of 
a pyramid scheme hence, it is not a prohibited scheme under the CPA. However, even 
though Herbalife may avoid being termed a pyramid scheme, it may not escape liability 
altogether. By misrepresenting to members the income they can expect to receive and 
by pressurising recruits to purchase products or attend events under the 
misapprehension that this will better their income, Herbalife is guilty of engaging in 
other forms of conduct deemed prohibited by the CPA.  
 
6.2 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are proposed: 
• In order to remain clear of being labelled a pyramid scheme, Herbalife must strive to 
maintain the threshold requirement of 80% of sales to external consumers thereby 
attempting to ensure that members receive more money from retail sales as opposed 
to recruitment. Furthermore, during promotion of the scheme, retail sales, and not 
recruitment, must be emphasised as being the main source of a member’s income.  
• Herbalife must proceed cautiously and be mindful of how it promotes its business 
opportunity to potential recruits so as to ensure that it is not engaging in other forms 
of proscribed conduct. The company must be clear in the message it sends out and 
make certain that, going forward, it makes accurate representations and provides 
recruits with a realistic expectation of their potential earnings. This can be done by 
keeping records and furnishing recruits with these records to enable them to make an 
informed decision regarding whether or not to join the Herbalife opportunity.  
                                                          
424 Milkweed ‘Herbalife Compliance Issues’ 20 November 2018 available at 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4223696-herbalife-compliance-issues?page=3 (accessed on 21 
November 2018). 
425 The warning, which is in the form of a disclaimer, is available at 
http://businessopportunity.herbalife.co.za/ (accessed on 21 November 2018). 
 
71 
 
The Herbalife company enjoys global success, however, its existence in South Africa 
may come to an untimely demise if it promotes its business opportunity in a manner 
that is tantamount to prohibited conduct under the CPA.  
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